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ABSTRACT 
Political scientists have conducted much work examining a court’s decision on the merits 
of a case.  We have concluded that ideology has a strong influence on the outcome on the merits 
of a decision.  Furthermore, courts seek to render a decision that is closest to their own policy 
preferences.  However, federal circuit courts within the judicial hierarchy are constrained by  
other actors according to the strategic model.   There is an abundance of evidence showing that 
superior actors constrain courts’ ideological preferences when such courts render decisions on 
the merits.  However, there is a dearth of scholarship regarding judicial decision making on 
threshold issues.  I argue that federal circuit courts set their judicial agendas by transforming 
their mandatory appellate jurisdiction into one that is discretionary. They achieve this goal by 
controlling the type of litigants who gain access to the courts by deciding cases on threshold 
grounds.  I also argue that federal circuit courts are responsive to changes in Congress’s ideology 
because Congress has power to control threshold issues through various mechanisms. I seek to 
establish that the grounds upon which a case is dismissed -- jurisdictional, justiciable, and 
procedural -- defines the parameters that constrain federal circuit courts.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Setting the Judicial Agenda 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court possesses an almost entirely discretionary docket whereby the 
justices choose which appeals will be reviewed. Losing parties may file a writ of certiorari 
asking the Court to hear their case; while the Court receives approximately 9,000 writs a year, it 
grants only about one percent of them. Political scientists argue that justices of the U.S. Supreme 
Court use the writ of certiorari as a mechanism to control the Court’s docket and set the judicial 
agenda (Boucher and Segal 1995; Caldeira et al. 1999; Baird 2007). Legal scholars argue that the 
Supreme Court renders certiorari decisions based on legal considerations such as Rule 10 of the 
Rules of the Supreme Court, which provides grounds to grant certiorari if a conflict exists among 
lower courts or if an important legal question is presented (see Perry 1991). However, other 
scholars have shown that justices cast certiorari votes primarily on ideological and strategic 
grounds, indicating that agenda control is largely based on personal policy preferences (see Segal 
and Spaeth 1993, 2002; Boucher and Segal 1995; and Caldeira et al. 1999).  
Alternatively, federal circuit courts have mandatory jurisdiction over appeals from 
federal district courts, therefore making it more difficult for circuit courts to set their own 
agendas. Yet, lower federal courts do have a mechanism whereby they can deny an appellant’s 
request to review a claim on its merits: they can dismiss a case on a threshold issue. Threshold 
issues are matters that a court must decide before it hears the merits of a litigant’s claim. Such 
issues include procedural rules, jurisdictional questions, and issues of justiciability. Procedural 
rules primarily govern the discovery and pleading stage of litigation. Jurisdictional questions 
govern whether Congress has given federal courts the power to adjudicate the claim. Justiciable 
issues address whether the litigant’s claim is viable for adjudication. Constitutionally, federal 
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courts’ power to adjudicate cases is limited to justiciable issues. Although the appellate 
jurisdiction of federal circuit courts is mandatory, circuit courts use threshold issues as a 
discretionary mechanism to control the type of litigants that can appeal the merits of an adverse 
decision and the type of claims that courts can render decisions on the merits. I study federal 
circuit courts because these courts serve as the final court of adjudication for the vast majority of 
appellants. Since the Supreme Court grants certiorari in only one percent of cases, federal circuit 
courts have an enormous influence on shaping the federal judicial agenda.  
The impact of decisions on threshold issues is important because a court can prevent a 
party from litigating the merits of a claim. In certain instances, a court will dismiss a litigant’s 
claim seeking relief with prejudice, permanently barring that party from litigating the merits of 
their particular claim. Decisions on these issues can thus prevent a court from ever rendering a 
decision on the merits of the claim and, accordingly, a litigant from ever obtaining redress for his 
or her grievances. Furthermore, if a court refuses to hear the claim, a litigant is without recourse 
in the judicial system. As a result, the implications of a court declining to reach the merits of a 
litigant’s claim are immense because a litigant will never have his or her “day in court.” The 
impact of a negative decision on a threshold issue is fatal not only for the litigant, but also for 
similarly situated litigants. If courts bar certain types of litigants from bringing lawsuits on the 
merits by ruling against those litigants based on a threshold issue, courts can effectively shape 
policy by discouraging and preventing potential plaintiffs from bringing similar lawsuits. Courts 
can therefore discourage litigation from entire classes of plaintiffs and/or types of claims.  
To further understand the grave consequences of decisions rendered on threshold 
grounds, anecdotal evidence is instructive. For example, in Warth v. Seldin (1975), the Supreme 
Court decided a case where the petitioners sought an injunction of a city’s ordinance that had the 
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effect of excluding low to moderate-income families from residing in a town. The Supreme 
Court, in a 5-4 decision divided primarily on ideological lines, held that a non-profit 
organization, taxpayers, and low-income residents lacked standing to bring their suit pursuant to 
the Fair Housing Act, thus dismissing it completely. Because the Supreme Court held that the 
petitioners lacked standing to sue the town, this had the effect of barring low-income individuals 
from even filing a lawsuit seeking affordable housing within the town. Not only did the Court 
fail to address the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, but the decision also bars similarly situated 
litigants from filing a lawsuit seeking affordable housing. Accordingly, this case had the 
substantive effect of barring other plaintiffs with similar grievances from gaining access to the 
courts.   
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992), the Supreme Court held that the Defenders of 
Wildlife, an environmental group, lacked standing to sue the federal government seeking 
enforcement of an endangered species act. The vote in Lujan was divided largely on ideological 
lines, with the conservative justices joining Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, and the more 
liberal Justices O’Connor, Blackmun, and Stevens dissenting. Protection for the environment is 
primarily viewed as a liberal issue, while conservatives have not been its chief promoters. Lujan 
had the effect of barring plaintiffs seeking enforcement of similar environmental regulations and 
discouraging plaintiffs with similar interests from filing a lawsuit seeking enforcement.  
More recently, in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (2007), the Court 
held that the State of Massachusetts had standing to sue the EPA. In EPA, various states and 
municipalities sued the EPA seeking enforcement of standards regulating emissions of carbon 
dioxide from automobiles.  Because the State of Massachusetts argued that it had standing to 
compel the EPA to enforce environmental regulations, we would expect that the liberal justices 
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would confer standing, while the conservative justices would deny standing to enforce such 
regulations. The justices’ ideological preferences can explain the 5-4 vote. As anticipated, 
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter, as the Court’s liberals, joined Justice Steven’s opinion. 
Additionally, Justice Kennedy, as the Court’s median justice, joined the liberal justices of the 
court. The conservatives of the Court, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, and Chief Justice 
Roberts, dissented on the grounds that Massachusetts lacked standing. The liberals of the Court 
were able to gain a majority to render a pro-environmental decision. Unlike the decision in 
Lujan, the liberals of the Court in EPA were able to gain a majority to render a pro-
environmental decision which expanded access to plaintiffs seeking enforcement of EPA 
regulations.  Because the Court held that the State of Massachusetts had standing, other states 
now have the ability to file a lawsuit seeking enforcement. 
Issues regarding access are also evident in cases involving procedural rules. In Bowles v. 
Russell (2007), the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that a convicted defendant was barred 
from appealing his sentence on the grounds that his appeal was untimely filed, despite the fact 
that the district court provided him with an incorrect date. The district court inexplicably gave 
the defendant, who was sentenced to fifteen years to life imprisonment for murder, a date for 
filing a notice of appeal that was beyond the time prescribed by statute and the Federal Rules. 
The court held that it had no equitable powers to extend the time for filing the notice of appeal. 
One would expect that the conservative justices would rule against the convicted and the liberal 
justices would rule in favor. As expected, the conservative justices, Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Thomas, Alito, Scalia, and the median justice Kennedy, comprised of the majority, while 
liberal justices Ginsberg, Breyer, Souter, and Stevens dissented.  Bowles also illustrates the grave 
consequences of an appellate court dismissing an appeal on threshold grounds. Because the 
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lower court dismissed the appeal, Bowles can never challenge the district court’s decision 
determining that his sentence did not violate the Constitution in an appellate court. Even though 
the law may clearly entitle Bowles to relief, he will never obtain that relief because the Court has 
held that his appeal was untimely. However, the aforementioned cases only provide anecdotal 
evidence of courts using threshold issues to bar certain litigants from gaining access to the 
courts.    
I present a theory explicating how federal circuit courts use threshold issues to set their 
judicial agendas by dismissing cases on threshold grounds. I argue that federal circuit courts 
decide cases on threshold grounds to further their own policy preferences.  I also argue that 
federal circuit courts are responsive to changes in Congress’s ideology because Congress has the 
power to control threshold issues through various mechanisms. In this chapter, I first discuss the 
literature regarding attitudinal and strategic theories of judicial decision making and how these 
theories apply to decisions in the federal court system. I then discuss how the institutional 
constraint of increasingly large caseloads of the federal circuits may impact decisions to dismiss 
on threshold grounds. Last, I discuss my theory explaining how circuit courts control their 
agendas by dismissing appeals on threshold grounds.  I end by providing a brief overview of the 
remaining chapters.  
1.2 Theoretical Foundations  
1.2.1 Theories of Judicial Decision Making 
Political scientists have provided well-documented evidence of the effects of ideology on 
judicial outcomes. The attitudinal model, the predominate theory of judicial decision-making in 
political science, states that justices of the Supreme Court decide cases according to their 
personal policy preferences without constraint from Congress or the president (Segal and Spaeth 
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1993, 2002).  Proponents of the attitudinal model state that justices are free to decide cases 
according to their ideological preferences because justices are appointed for lifetime tenure, 
generally have no other ambition to seek higher office, and have little political accountability.    
However, scholars find evidence that place the tenets of the attitudinal model into doubt 
at least to the extent that justices consider other things in addition to their personal preferences. 
The strategic model of judicial decision making argues that justices do not solely vote their 
sincere policy preferences, but seek to maximize their policy preferences in view of the 
preferences of other players (Epstein and Knight 1998; Spiller and Gely 1992). In particular, this 
model provides that justices of the Supreme Court cast their votes in view of Congress’s power 
to override their decisions and, therefore, justices make strategic choices in order to maximize 
their policy preferences in view of any possible retaliation from external political actors (Epstein 
and Knight 1998). This also model provides that justices craft opinions considering the 
preferences of other justices in order to gain a majority vote (Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 
1999; 2000).  
Walter Murphy (1964) was among the first pioneers to recognize that the justices of the 
Supreme Court do not decide cases unencumbered. He argued that the Court has political 
constraints of which it must be aware, including the president’s power to ignore a decision of the 
Court by not enforcing it and his power to nominate jurists who share his ideology. Testing the 
strategic model has always been somewhat problematic, as it is difficult to distinguish strategic 
considerations from sincere preferences (Segal and Spaeth 2002; Baum 1978). However, there 
have been several attempts to test the validity of this theory through what are known as 
separation-of-powers models. Building upon Murphy’s work, scholars provide a more nuanced 
theory considering subsequent scholarship explaining the interaction between the political 
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branches of government and the Supreme Court. Among these is Eskridge (1991b) who builds 
on Murphy’s qualitative analysis. In a formal model named the Court/Congress/President game, 
Eskridge states the Court must be cognizant of the Congressional committee whose jurisdiction 
governs the requisite subject matter, Congress if the bill goes to the floor, and the President as he 
has the power to veto legislation. Because the Court is aware of this game, Eskridge states, the 
Court seeks to maximize its policy preferences while also adopting a policy that will not risk 
retaliation by these other actors (Eskridge 1991b). While Eskridge finds Congressional 
committees relevant, Spiller and Gely (1992) argue that the Court seeks to place its decision 
between the preferences of the House and Senate. They also find that the Court responds to 
interest groups that are likely to lobby Members of Congressional committees. Ferejohn and 
Weingast (1992b) continue to modify previous separation-of-powers games by asserting that the 
Court, acting as a sophisticated honest agent, considers the policies of the current Congress by 
interpreting a statutory provision on the ideal point of the chamber that is closest to the Court’s 
own precedent, which is the status quo. King (2007) also finds evidence supporting the strategic 
model. He finds that the Supreme Court decides cases raising issues involving statutory 
interpretation on constitutional grounds rather than statutory grounds when circumstances are 
favorable for a Congressional override. Therefore, the threat of a Congressional override is a 
check against a majority’s unfettered power to use its own policy preferences. Also, Spiller and 
Gely (1992) find that the Supreme Court crafts its opinions considering Congressional 
preferences regarding decisions involving the National Labor Relations Board.  
Much of the scholarship examining the strategic model focuses on the U.S. Supreme 
Court. However, scholars have also studied the effects of strategic decision making within 
federal circuit courts. In particular, scholars have studied whether circuit courts are responsive to 
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changes in Congressional ideology. In examining cases involving health and safety issues, 
Revesz (2001) finds no evidence of DC Circuit judges’ acting in response to changes in the party 
of the president or in Congress. Hume (2009) also finds no evidence that circuit panels consider 
Congress’s ideological preferences when deciding cases challenging the reasonableness of an 
agency’s decision. Although, Cross (2007) finds no evidence that circuit courts are responsive to 
changes in the liberal filibuster-veto point in Congress, he finds evidence that circuit courts do 
respond to changes in the conservative filibuster-veto point.  
Although scholars do not agree on the influence of Congressional preferences on circuit 
court decisions, circuit courts have another principal to whom they must respond: The U.S. 
Supreme Court. Songer et al. (1994) find that circuit court panels both follow Supreme Court 
mandates (responsiveness) and modify decisions in conformity with the Supreme Court 
(congruence). Interestingly, Cross (2007) finds that circuit courts follow Supreme Court 
precedent from prior Courts rather than the current Court. However, Klein and Hume (2003) find 
that circuit courts are not responsive to Supreme Court preferences based on the evidence that 
circuit courts are not more likely to decide “certiorari worthy” cases consistent with Supreme 
Court preferences. This evidence indicates that circuit courts do not seek to shelter themselves 
from reversal.  
In addition to considering the preferences of outside actors, circuit courts must be 
cognizant of the preferences of their colleagues sitting on their court. Circuit courts are unique 
insofar as judges who sit on those courts render decisions in three-judge panels. Public law 
scholars have studied the impact of decision making in this context, providing a theory called 
panel effects. The theory of panel effects provides that a judge’s colleagues sitting on a panel 
influences that judge’s vote (Cross 2007).  Empirical evidence provides support for this theory. 
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Cross and Tiller (1998) find evidence that DC Circuit Court judges who sat on panels with a 
judge appointed by the opposition party (split panels) were more likely to vote according to the 
preferences of the opposition-party judge than judges who sat on panels who were all appointed 
by members of the same party (unified panels). Beyond ideology, Kastellec (2013) finds that the 
presence of an African American judge sitting on a panel increases the likelihood of the panel 
upholding an affirmative action policy.  
District court judges behave in a similarly ideological fashion as other judges who sit on 
the federal bench (Rowland and Carp 1996). Regarding their place in the judicial hierarchy, 
circuit courts are less likely to reverse a district court’s decision on the merits when the judge’s 
preferences are consistent with the panel’s preferences (Haire et al. 2003). Moreover, Randazzo 
et al. (2006) finds that district court judges constrain their ideological preferences when they 
anticipate a negative response from a circuit court. Furthermore, as the ideological distance 
between the district judge and the circuit panel increases, the likelihood of reversal also 
increases. We know that district court judges have an interest in seeking a higher office and, as a 
result, seek to protect their professional reputation by minimizing the number of reversals (Klein 
and Hume 2003).   
1.2.2 Theories of Judicial Decision Making and Agenda Control 
While considerable scholarship focuses on the extent to which justices decide cases 
according to their personal policy preferences, public law scholars also argue that justices rely on 
their preferences at the agenda setting stage. The Supreme Court controls access by screening 
cases through certiorari review (Baird 2007). Although Rule 10 provides that the Supreme Court 
may grant certiorari in cases where a conflict exists among lower courts or an important legal 
question is presented, this procedural rule exerts little constraint on a majority that seeks to 
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implement its own policy preferences. Even more, justices have proactively used this Rule to 
further their own policy goals. For example, Ulmer (1972) was among the first to determine that 
justices use certiorari to further their own agendas, finding that justices grant certiorari in cases 
they want to reverse. A few years later, Baum (1978) found that justices grant the writ when a 
lower court decision significantly departs from their own ideological preferences.  
Later researchers have also supplied evidence that courts use certiorari to further their 
own ideological preferences. Brenner and Krol (1989) find that justices who voted to grant 
certiorari are more likely to reverse than affirm the lower court decision at the merits stage. 
Perry’s (1991) qualitative research shows that justices act strategically by defensively denying 
certiorari when that justice’s preferred position is unlikely to prevail at the merits stage. Since the 
Court has a tendency to reverse cases it grants certiorari, justices are cautious in casting certiorari 
votes because of the risk of establishing precedent that is incongruent with their policy 
preferences. Perry’s research also shows that justices “aggressively grant” certiorari in cases they 
believe would not only prevail on the merits, but also further ideologically congruent legal 
doctrine or overrule unfavorable precedent. Caldeira et al. (1999) provide empirical evidence 
supporting Perry’s qualitative findings. They find evidence of both “aggressive grants” and 
“defensive denials.”  However, Boucher and Segal (1995) find that justices vote to “aggressively 
grant” certiorari in cases they seek to affirm, but do not “defensively deny” when they want to 
reverse. Although certiorari is a procedural tool, the substantive implications are evident to both 
litigants and members of the Court.  
Recently, scholars have considered the impact of Congressional preferences on the 
Supreme Court’s decisions to grant certiorari. Extending Eskridge’s theory, Epstein, Segal, and 
Victor (2002) argue that the Supreme Court renders decisions to grant certiorari based on 
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Congressional preferences. They find that justices are more likely to either deny certiorari or 
decide the case on constitutional grounds if believe that their preferences in statutory cases are 
incongruent with Congressional preferences. Epstein et al. argue that justices of the Supreme 
Court are just as attentive to Congressional preferences when deciding cases at the merits stage, 
as they are attentive to those preferences at the agenda-setting stage. They further argue that 
justices seek to invite less scrutiny by acting strategically at the agenda-setting stage than 
inviting more attention and scrutiny at the merits stage. Extending Epstein’s et al. theory, Harvey 
and Freidman (2009) argue that the Court is not as insulated as previously believed from 
Congressional retaliation when it renders decisions on constitutional grounds. They find that the 
Court is less likely to grant certiorari seeking to review the constitutionality of a Congressional 
statute as the policy preferences of the median justice becomes farther from Congressional 
preferences. That is, the Court is constrained by Congressional preferences and acts strategically 
even at the certiorari stage.  
1.3 Threshold Issues  
Scholarship provides evidence that justices of the Supreme Court decide to cast certiorari 
votes according to attitudinal and strategic considerations, but also such influences are evident in 
justices’ decisions on threshold issues. Political scientists have yet to provide substantial 
scholarship examining implications of ideology on threshold decisions. Of the few studies, 
Rathjen and Spaeth (1979) provide evidence of the effects of ideology in cases decided on 
threshold grounds. They find that justices of the Burger Court used threshold issues either as a 
gatekeeping function to manage its caseload, exercise judicial restraint, or veil ideological 
decision making. Although Rathjen and Spaeth examine a variety of threshold issues, the 
majority of scholarship regarding such issues focuses on justiciability, and particularly standing. 
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Among these is Segal and Spaeth (1993, 2002), who provide summary statistics that indicate 
ideological decision making in standing decisions of justices of the Supreme Court. They 
surveyed cases from 1953 to 2000 that the Supreme Court questioned a litigant’s standing to sue. 
They find that the Warren Court conferred standing in 68.9 percent of cases, while the Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts held plaintiffs had standing in 42.7 and 38.6 percent of cases, respectively 
(2002, 233). The decline from the Warren Court through the Rehnquist Court is significant. 
However, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of standing in only a small number of cases. 
Within the terms examined, only 174 cases within that period addressed standing. Of those 174, 
the Court held that the litigant lacked standing in 90 cases.  
There is also empirical work regarding the effects of threshold issues and ideology within 
lower federal courts. Similar to scholarship studying the U.S. Supreme Court, much of the 
scholarship studying lower federal courts is devoted to the issue of standing. Staudt (2004) finds 
that both policy preferences and legal rules impact decisions in cases involving taxpayer standing 
at all levels of federal courts. Pierce (1999), in examining both standing and ripeness decisions in 
the federal circuit courts, finds that conservative judges are more likely to deny standing to 
plaintiffs asserting environmental claims than liberal judges. Additionally, Cross (2007) 
examines ideology and threshold issues in the federal circuit courts. He finds that as Congress 
becomes more conservative, circuit courts are more likely to reach a conservative decision on the 
threshold issue. However, Cross does not distinguish among different types of threshold issues. 
Kaheny (2010) finds that federal circuit court judges are more likely to decide issues in 
conformance with their own ideological preferences when deciding whether the litigant is the 
proper party to bring the action. Kaheny’s scholarship is also limited insofar as she only 
distinguishes threshold issues on the basis of the proper party to bring the action and the proper 
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forum of the court.  Fix and Randazzo (2010) employ a qualitative analysis finding support that 
federal circuit courts decide cases on threshold grounds in order to avoid reaching the merits 
because they desire to defer to the preferences of the president in cases involving national 
security. However, their theory may be confined to cases of national security because of the dire 
consequences for second-guessing the president’s judgment in this issue area. 
Furthermore, there is little scholarship regarding district court decision making on 
threshold issues. Rowland and Todd (1991) find that the ideology of a district court judge 
impacts standing decisions. Judges who were appointed by President Reagan were slightly less 
likely to confer standing to litigants classified as “underdogs” than President Carter-appointed 
judges. Moreover, Braman (2006) finds experimental evidence that legally-trained participants 
acting as district court judges looked to the merits of a case to ascertain their ideological 
preferences when determining their decision to confer standing to a litigant. Therefore, the 
evidence tends to establish that district court judges decide threshold issues in a manner that is 
most congruent with their preferences on the merits of the case. Rendering a judgment on a 
threshold issue as opposed to the merits of a case provides an opportunity to control the 
substantive outcome without reaching the merits.  
However, empirical evidence also shows that Congress seeks to control threshold issues 
to produce results congruent with their own policy preferences (Lindquist and Yalof 2001).  
Curry (2007), in testing the likelihood of the House passing legislation modifying diversity 
jurisdiction, finds that as the workload of federal district courts and the ideological distance 
between the federal judiciary and the House increase, the likelihood of Congress limiting 
diversity jurisdiction increases. Smith (2006) finds that liberal Members of Congress are more 
likely than conservative Members to support statutory provisions that provide a private right of 
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action for environmental regulatory provisions. That is, Members change judicial procedures to 
allow plaintiffs to bring suits that are ideologically congruent with their own position. Also, 
Democrat-controlled committees are more likely to confer standing to such plaintiffs than 
Republican-controlled committees. Additionally, Smith finds that Members of Congress are 
more likely to support standing provisions when those Members are more ideologically aligned 
with federal district courts. One could surmise that Members believe courts that are closer to 
their ideological preferences are more likely to render decisions more favorable to their policy 
position. Additionally, Frymer (2003) provides qualitative evidence that Congress gave the 
federal courts authority to amend the Federal Rules of Procedure to aid plaintiffs in asserting 
civil rights claims. This literature provides support that Congress is aware that threshold rules 
have substantive implications and Congress amends such rules for courts to render decisions in 
conformity with their preferences. 
1.4 Legal Considerations 
Many proponents of the attitudinal and strategic models often argue that the law exerts 
little restraint on a judge’s ability to render a decision based on his or her personal policy 
preferences. Nevertheless, more recent scholars find evidence that legal considerations serve as a 
constraint on judges’ preferences. Tiede (2007) finds evidence that federal district court judges 
changed their sentencing behavior after Congress enacted the Sentencing Guidelines. 
Furthermore, Randazzo and Waterman (2006) find that judges sitting on the federal circuit courts 
changed their voting behavior when Congress enacted statutes to curb their ideological 
inclinations. Concerning the Supreme Court, Bailey and Maltzman (2008) find that justices are 
constrained by legal doctrines such as precedent when deciding issues of the First Amendment.  
Although other scholars have found evidence that legal doctrines influence decision making (see 
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Epstein and Koblka 1992; George and Epstein 1992; Songer and Lindquist 1996; Corley et al. 
2013). However, other scholars have found evidence that legal doctrine serves as a weak 
constraint on attitudes (Howard and Segal 2004). Likewise, I argue that legal factors serve as a 
weak constraint on attitudes as doctrines explicating threshold issues generally are within the 
discretion of the court. 
1.5 Theory 
In this dissertation, I argue that federal circuit courts set their judicial agendas by 
transforming their mandatory appellate jurisdiction into one that is discretionary. They achieve 
this goal by controlling the type of litigants who gain access to the courts by deciding cases on 
threshold grounds. Because conservatives tend to favor business interests while liberals tend to 
favor individuals litigants (Howard and Brazelton 2014 forthcoming), I argue that conservative 
panels are more likely than liberal panels to rule against individuals when appealing a judgment 
disposing a case on threshold grounds.  However, I argue that federal circuit courts are not free 
to vote their sincere policy preferences. They must act strategically because Congress has the 
power to constrain federal courts by enacting legislation governing threshold issues. 
Consequently, federal circuit courts do not want to invite retaliation from Congress and, 
therefore, curb their ability to decide threshold issues in conformance with their own policy 
preferences.  
Generally, Congress’s ability to override an incongruent statutory decision is piecemeal; 
such change takes place one statute at a time and typically affects one issue area. In contrast, 
Congress’s ability to control threshold issues is vast.  A change in a threshold rule can impact a 
number of issues areas. More importantly, any Congressional change in a threshold rule will 
impede federal courts’ ability to set their own judicial agendas. Congress enacting a law 
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modifying threshold issues is akin to Congress controlling the Supreme Court’s certiorari review 
(see Boucher and Segal 1995; Caldeira et al. 1999; Baird 2007). As Epstein, Segal and Victor 
(2002) argue that justices of the Supreme Court seek to invite less scrutiny by acting strategically 
at the agenda-setting stage than the merits stage, I likewise argue that federal circuit courts seek 
to invite less scrutiny at their agenda-setting stage than at the merits stage. I further argue that 
federal circuit courts view Congressional regulation of threshold issues as a substantial threat to 
their power to set their own agendas. Because they seek to invite less scrutiny, they are more 
responsive to Congressional preferences regarding threshold issues than issues presented at the 
merits stage. Therefore, I argue that federal circuit courts seek to maximize their policy 
preferences, but act strategically because they are constrained by Congressional preferences.  
I derive my theory from the literature establishing that federal courts are responsive to 
Congressional preferences (Eskridge 1991b; Cross 2007). Because federal circuit courts must be 
cognizant of the Judiciary Committees that act as gatekeepers for any bills seeking to modify 
laws regulating the power of federal courts dismiss on threshold grounds (Eskridge 1991b), I 
argue that federal circuit courts are cognizant of who sits on Congressional committees. 
Accordingly, federal circuit courts act strategically by not deciding cases outside of the confines 
of Congressional committee preferences. Unlike the literature that provides that federal circuit 
courts generally are not responsive to Congressional preferences (Revesz 2001; Hume 2009), I 
argue that federal circuit courts are very keen to Congressional preferences on threshold issues.  
I argue that federal circuit courts set their judicial agendas by transforming their 
mandatory appellate jurisdiction into one that is discretionary by rendering decisions on the 
threshold grounds of procedure, jurisdiction, and justiciability. I delineate between these three 
types of threshold issues because the degree which circuit courts are constrained depends on the 
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type of threshold issue presented. Federal courts have the power to create procedural rules, but 
federal courts do so subject to Congressional oversight. Congress solely controls the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts, providing courts with little power to control their jurisdiction. Article III of 
the Constitution provides that federal courts can only adjudicate justiciable issues. Because 
justiciability is generally a constitutional question, federal courts possess discretion for deciding 
which cases are justiciable. However, a subset of justiciable issues falls outside of the 
requirements of the Constitution. This subset is called prudential standing. That is, federal courts 
have created the common-law doctrine of prudential standing that goes beyond the requirements 
of constitutionally justiciable cases. Under the doctrine of prudential standing, courts can deny 
standing when a plaintiff challenges a Congressional statute. Federal courts are interpreting that 
Congressional statute to determine if Congress intended to confer a private right of action under 
the statute. However, Congress can confer prudential standing to the class of litigants when 
courts have previously denied standing. Congress has the power to do so because federal courts 
are interpreting Congressional statutory intent rather than standing pursuant to Article III. 
Because Congress has some control over each type of threshold issue, I argue that federal circuit 
panels act strategically to shield themselves from an adverse Congressional action.  
However, I must account for an alternative theory to my main contention that federal 
circuit courts use threshold issues to set their agendas. Another important institutional constraint 
is the ever-increasing caseload of the federal courts. Large caseloads allow less time to address 
the merits of a case. That is, large caseloads strain scarce judicial resources, which may 
encourage panels to use the more expedient method of disposing cases on threshold grounds. 
Scholars have noted the effects of heavy caseloads within the federal judicial system. Large 
dockets create an environment where judges are overworked. Therefore, heavy caseloads lead to 
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inconsistencies in the law, delay in redressing grievances and, as a result, decreased confidence 
and legitimacy in the judicial system (O’Scannlian 1999). O'Scannlain (1999) finds that heavy 
caseloads for the Ninth Circuit, which carries almost 20 percent of the federal docket, have 
contributed to its failure to adequately resolve legal conflicts within the Circuit. Scott (2006, 
341) finds that of the cases that the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari from 1985 to 2005, the 
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit an average of 14.48 times, with the Fifth Circuit 
having the next highest rate of 5.14 reversals per term.  Even more, the Supreme Court reversed 
many unanimous decisions appealed from the Ninth Circuit. This is compared to an average 
reversal rate of about 3.5 percent of appeals from other circuit courts. These studies provide 
some evidence that because the Ninth Circuit carries the largest caseload, heavy caseloads 
impede that Circuit’s ability to render quality decisions and to alleviate its large caseload. The 
Ninth Circuit’s high reversal rate may lend support to this notion.  
Not only could large caseloads impede a circuit court’s ability to render quality decisions, 
large caseloads may constrain ideological decision making. For example, Hall (1985) finds that 
the ideology of justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana was curbed in cases that 
were appealed pursuant to that court’s mandatory jurisdiction.  Because the mandatory 
jurisdiction is comprised of 80 percent of that court’s caseload, justices may be inclined to gather 
a consensus in order to avoid incurring the costs of crafting a dissent (1985, 253; but see Corley 
et al. (2013) finding no support that decreasing caseloads allow for greater opportunity for 
dissensus among justices of the Supreme Court.). Hall’s finding lends support that heavy 
caseloads curb ideological voting to preserve scarce judicial resources lending support for the 
notion that heavy caseloads limit scarce judicial resources. Circuit courts may not dispose of 
cases on threshold ground to further their policy preferences, but may do so to provide a more 
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expedient manner of disposing cases. Similarly, heavy circuit court caseloads may not only 
impede ideological voting on the merits but also could encourage disposition of cases on 
threshold grounds to preserve scarce judicial resources. I therefore control for the caseload of 
federal circuit courts as they may be more inclined to dispose of cases on threshold grounds to 
alleviate the burden of increasingly large caseloads. 
1.6 Chapter Outline 
This dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I discuss how federal circuit courts 
set their agendas by deciding cases on grounds of procedural rules to control which types of 
litigants that gain access to federal courts. Federal courts have power to promulgate procedural 
rules, which governs rules for filing claims and pleadings. I examine a commonly raised 
procedural rule, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs sanctions for 
parties and attorneys when they file claims on objectionable grounds. I show how the ideology of 
the panel affects decisions to sanction parties based on whether the party is a business or an 
individual litigant. However, the panel’s ability to render these decisions in conformance to their 
ideology is not unfettered. Congress can override any rules promulgated by the federal courts. 
Because this unique conferral of power resembles the conferral of power Congress has given to 
bureaucracy agencies, I draw on bureaucracy literature to examine judicial decision making in 
this context. Since Congress maintains oversight, I examine whether circuit courts are responsive 
to changes in Congressional preferences. I end by discussing the consequences of the denial of 
access on procedural grounds. 
In Chapter 3, I examine how circuit courts control access by deciding cases on 
jurisdictional grounds. Particularly, I examine decisions to certify a class in class action lawsuits. 
Conservatives who are traditionally aligned with business interests are arguably more likely to 
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deny class certification for plaintiffs seeking to sue businesses and corporations. As an example, 
I discuss the recent Supreme Court case of Wal-Mart v. Dukes (2011), where a conservative 
majority denied an entire class of plaintiffs the ability to proceed as a class to sue Wal-Mart for 
discrimination on the basis of gender. I then empirically test whether conservative circuit courts 
use jurisdictional issues to limit access for plaintiffs seeking class certification. I argue that 
federal circuit courts seek to maintain control over jurisdictional decisions to control which 
litigants can gain access to the courts through certification decisions and, therefore, set their own 
judicial agendas. However, I argue that federal circuit courts are keenly aware of Congressional 
preferences and seek to maximize their preferences within the confines of Congressional 
preferences. I test my theory by examining whether circuit courts are responsive to changes in 
Congressional ideology since Congress controls the jurisdiction of the federal courts. I then 
discuss the implications of the denial of access to the courts in certification decisions.  
In Chapter 4, I discuss how circuit courts control access in decisions to grant prudential 
standing. Unlike Article III standing, federal courts have further limited plaintiffs’ ability to 
bring suits challenging a federal statute under the doctrine of prudential standing. If a court 
denies prudential standing, Congress can later confer standing to the class of plaintiffs. I also 
argue that federal circuit courts seek to control access by rendering decisions to maximize their 
policy preferences within the preferences of Congress. I examine decisions to confer prudential 
standing to plaintiffs seeking to enforce the Fair Housing Act of 1968. This Act creates a right of 
action for persons alleging discrimination in the housing market. I discuss the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Warth v. Seldin (1975) to deny plaintiffs seeking redress under the Act. Using 
quantitative analysis, I test theory by examining panels’ decisions to grant or deny prudential 
standing to plaintiffs.  
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I conclude in Chapter 5 with thoughts examining the mechanisms that circuit courts use 
to set their agendas. I explore the implications of federal circuit courts using threshold issues to 
control the type of litigants that gains access to the courts. I argue that my findings highlight how 
circuit courts achieve this objective. I then discuss the broader implications of federal courts 
denying certain litigants access to the courts. I end by discussing plans for future research in 
federal and state courts’ use of threshold issues to set their judicial agendas. 
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2 CHAPTER 2: IDEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF  
THE FEDERAL RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In 1999, Keith Bowles was convicted in state court of murder and sentenced to fifteen 
years to life imprisonment. After exhausting his appeals in state court, Bowles’s only recourse 
was to file a habeas corpus petition in federal court. Bowles subsequently filed a habeas petition 
and a federal district court denied his petition on the merits. After additional pleadings, the 
federal district court entered an order that purportedly stated the last date for filing a notice of 
appeal. However, the district court made a clerical error and provided Bowles with an incorrect 
date, which was three days beyond the time stipulated by Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
and by statute. Bowles filed his notice of appeal before the date provided by the district court but 
after the time stipulated by the Rules. Bowles then appealed to the Sixth Circuit and that Court 
dismissed Bowles’s appeal as untimely. Bowles then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for 
review of the Sixth Circuit’s decision dismissing his appeal as untimely.  
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Circuit lacked jurisdiction over 
Bowles’s appeal because it lacked discretion to extend the time period for filing a notice of 
appeal. All of the conservatives ruled against Bowles, stating that federal courts are without 
discretion in extending the time for filing a notice of appeal as provided by statute and the 
Federal Rules. The conservative majority characterized the Rule as jurisdictional and, therefore, 
held that it could not modify the jurisdiction of the federal courts. However, the Court’s liberals 
dissented, arguing that time standards are not jurisdictional; rather, time standards are procedural 
rules devised by federal courts to conduct their business. In Justice Souter’s dissent, he argued 
that the Court has power to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal especially since the 
23 
appellant relied on the date the district court provided him. Justice Souter also stated that it is 
unjust to deny Bowles’s appeal given he relied to his detriment on the date provided to him by 
the district court. The split decision on ideological lines suggests that the conservatives of the 
court used time standards to bar this convicted criminal defendant from appealing an adverse 
decision on the merits, while the liberals sought to provide him with the opportunity to appeal 
the decision.  
The issues presented in this case leads to my research question: Do federal courts use 
procedural rules to control the type of litigants who can gain access to the courts in order to set 
their judicial agendas?  The issue underlying this research question is demonstrated in the Bowles 
case. A court was required to decide whether Bowles’s notice of appeal was timely filed before it 
reviewed the decision of the district court denying his habeas petition. Because the Supreme 
Court held that Bowles’s appeal was untimely, a federal appellate court will never review the 
decision of the district court denying Bowles’s habeas petition. Consequently, the conservatives 
of the Court denied Bowles access to appeal the denial of his habeas petition, while liberals 
sought to grant him access. The consequences of the Bowles decision are grave as Bowles can 
never challenge the constitutionality of his sentence in a federal appellate court. I discuss Bowles 
as an example of the dire consequences of courts denying a litigant access based on a procedural 
rule. However, cases like Bowles are not the norm in that federal courts do not ordinarily provide 
litigants with the wrong deadline for filing appeals. I therefore test my theory by examining a 
subset of cases of rules for filing claims that are more frequently litigated in federal courts: 
circuit court decisions governing sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  
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In this chapter, I demonstrate that courts decide cases presenting questions of procedural 
rules according to their personal policy preferences. I argue that the federal circuit courts do so to 
set their judicial agendas. I specifically examine whether federal circuit courts use the Federal 
Rules of Practice and Procedure to control which type of litigants gain access to the courts. 
These Rules are unique insofar as Congress has delegated its authority to devise these Rules to 
the federal courts pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act. Drawing from the bureaucratic literature, I 
set forth a theory explaining the relationship between Congress and the federal judiciary 
regarding procedural issues. I then test my theory by examining circuit court cases involving 
Rule 11.  
2.2 The Rules Enabling Act 
2.2.1 A Historical Perspective  
In 1934, Congress enacted the Rules Enabling Act transferring power from the Attorney 
General to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to promulgate the Federal Rules of Practice 
and Procedure. The Act states that any promulgation of the Rules cannot “abridge, modify, or 
enlarge any substantial right” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Congress transferred power on the premise 
that the Rules were to have no substantive implications, but were to assist federal courts in 
conducting their business (Bone 1999).  
In 1958, Congress transferred this rulemaking function from the Supreme Court to the 
Judicial Conference of the United States. The Conference, chaired by the Chief Justice of the 
United States, is comprised of chief judges of all the federal courts of appeals and a district judge 
within each circuit. The district judge is elected by a majority of the judges within the circuit. 
The Judicial Conference appoints Advisory Committees on the Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Bankruptcy, Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence. These committees consider 
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suggestions regarding changes to the Rules from the bench, bar, and members of the public. If an 
advisory committee finds that a suggestion to change a rule has merit, it then drafts a proposed 
rule, publishes the proposal, and submits the proposal to the Standing Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure for approval. If the Standing Committee approves the proposed rule, the 
proposal is published for public comment. If the Standing Committee approves the proposed rule 
after a notice and comment period, it then transmits the proposal to the Judicial Conference. If 
the Judicial Conference approves the proposal, the Conference submits the proposed rule to the 
Supreme Court for further review. If approved, the Supreme Court must issue an order by May 1 
promulgating the rule to take effect no earlier than December 1. After the Supreme Court 
promulgates the rule, Congress has until December 1 to override the rule before it takes effect.  
As early as 1938, the Supreme Court amended the Rules allowing plaintiffs to more 
easily assert and support their claims in federal court (Frymer 2003). In particular, the discovery 
requirements were liberalized allowing plaintiffs to request a substantial amount of information 
from defendants to support their claims. Additional rule changes also allowed more liberal 
requirements for those seeking to certify members of a class action lawsuit. These changes were 
advocated by the American Bar Association to render it easier for the general public to gain 
access to the courts. Although Frymer (2003) finds no qualitative evidence that the 1938 
amendments were promulgated on ideological grounds, he finds that rule changes in the mid-
1960s and 1970s were enacted to help facilitate filing civil rights claims. As an example, Rule 53 
conferred authority to special masters to enforce consent decrees between unions and civil rights 
plaintiffs. As Frymer concludes, the intent and/or effect of these rule changes were substantive in 
nature, creating an environment conducive to successfully litigating civil rights claims. The 
Supreme Court did not amend the Rules again until it amended the Rules of Evidence in 1972. 
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Congress believed that the Supreme Court exceeded its authority by creating Rules that had 
substantive implications (Burbank 2004). For the first time, Congress prevented the Rules from 
taking effect. Congress enacted legislation that substantially revised the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (McCabe 1995).  
In 1988, Congress again revised the procedure to amend the Federal Rules. One of the 
changes that Congress incorporated was to open the amendment process to the public. Similar to 
the notice and comment period required for rules promulgated by administrative agencies 
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the goal of the notice and comment period 
is to provide the public with an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process. Certain 
interest groups are active in the notice and comment process as procedural rules can have 
substantive implications for certain litigants (McCabe 1995). Another major reform revising the 
Federal Rules was the enactment of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. The purpose of this 
Act was to streamline trials and decrease costs and delays in federal district courts (McArthur 
1999). The Act required district court judges to appoint an advisory committee to promulgate 
local rules and report cases that were on a court’s docket for an extended period of time.  
Even more changes were proposed when Republicans gained a majority in the House in 
1994 with its “Contract with America,” having tort reform as one of their top legislative 
priorities. Republicans then introduced several bills seeking to modify the Federal Rules to 
render it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in court. For example, Republicans introduced 
legislation to change the American Rule, which provides that each party pays their own 
attorney’s fees, to the English Rule which states that the losing party pays the winner’s attorney’s 
fees (Rowe 1997). House Republicans were successful in passing the Attorney Accountability 
Act requiring a party to pay opposing party’s attorney’s fees if that party rejected a settlement 
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offer and was subsequently awarded a smaller judgment than the settlement offer. The 
aforementioned legislation demonstrates that political parties recognize the substantive 
implications of procedural rules and how these rules can grant or deny litigants access to federal 
courts.   
2.2.2     Rule 11 and Sanctions  
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been subject to much political 
debate. Pursuant to Rule 11, attorneys must attest to the following regarding any lawsuits filed:  
“(1) [the claim] is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as 
to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing 
existing law or for establishing new law; 
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so 
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for 
further investigation or discovery; and 
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if 
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.” 
Rule 11(b)(1)-(4), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A party may move a court to 
sanction an alleged violator, whether party or attorney, if there is cause to believe that the 
Rules have been violated. Additionally, a court may impose a sanction on its own 
initiative if it deems that an attorney or party has violated the Rule.  
In 1983, the Supreme Court amended Rule 11, removing a court’s discretion to find an 
attorney or party in violation by requiring courts to impose sanctions against a noncompliant 
party. The change may have been prompted by the growth of litigation due to the proliferation of 
laws conferring a private right of action (Schwarzer 1994). However, the impact of the Rule 
disproportionally affected plaintiffs. According to a study conducted by the Federal Judicial 
Center, plaintiffs who were civil rights litigants were sanctioned at a higher rate than those who 
asserted tort or contractual claims (Schwarzer 1994). Some argue that the amended Rule was a 
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direct attempt to curb plaintiffs’ ability to assert substantive claims in court by limiting a 
plaintiff’s ability to assert broad claims at the pleading stage (Redish and Amuluru 2005).  
In 1993, the Judicial Conference sought to address some of the concerns and disparities 
that arose as a result of the changes to the 1983 amendment. Particularly, the Rule was changed 
to allow plaintiffs to assess the merits of claims after discovery and, therefore, giving the 
attorney an opportunity to develop and revise pleadings as they discovered evidence. Some argue 
that the change in this Rule created an environment that is more conducive to plaintiffs asserting 
substantive rights (Redish and Amuluru 2005). The Rule provided plaintiffs more leeway to 
further develop their substantive claims to conform to newly discovered evidence.  
The amendment also required parties to give notice to opposing counsel when a party 
filed a motion for sanctions. It provided an alleged violator with an opportunity to remedy any 
objectionable conduct. The most significant amendment to Rule 11 was a provision that required 
courts to sanction a party when it found them in violation of the Rule. Although the Rule 
required sanctions, the drafters stated that courts could devise novel methods of sanctioning 
violators including monetary or nonmonetary sanctions (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Comment to 1993 Amendment). Nonmonetary sanctions could range from finding the violator in 
contempt or dismissing the violator’s case. Monetary sanctions included paying the opposing 
party attorney’s fee and costs. The drafters emphasized that the purpose of the amended Rule 
was to deter objectionable conduct rather than to reward the opposing party. As such, the 
Comments provide that monetary fines should be paid to the opposing party only in “unusual 
circumstances.” This is a change from the prior Rule, which courts routinely awarded attorney’s 
fees to the opposing party when a violator was sanctioned (Schwarzer 1994).  
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The 1993 changes were not well-received by the new Republican House. As previously 
mentioned, they advocated sweeping tort reform in its Contract with America. In response to the 
liberalization of Rule 11, they sought to amend many of changes that were made. Particularly, 
they introduced legislation that required sanctions once a court found a violation as provided in 
the 1983 Rules. Republicans also introduced legislation that eliminated the “safe harbor” 
provision to allow attorneys to correct objectionable conduct as a remedy to a violation. House 
Republicans specifically opposed the drafter’s primary purpose of deterring sanctionable actions 
to compensating opposing counsel and parties by requiring the violator to pay opposing party’s 
attorney’s fees and costs (Rowe 1997). Although the foregoing bills were unsuccessful, Congress 
passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which required courts to make a 
written finding whether any party or attorney had violated Rule 11 in a class action securities 
lawsuit. Sanctions for violations are mandatory having a presumption of an award of an 
attorney’s fees in certain instances. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(c). President Clinton vetoed the 
legislation, but Congress successfully overrode the veto. In 2004, House Republicans again 
sought to amend Rule 11. They sought to change the provision to remove courts’ discretion to 
impose sanctions when a party is in violation. The amendment would reinstate the provision in 
the 1983 rule that required courts to sanction a party when the court finds a party in violation of 
the rule (Redish and Amuluru 2005).   
2.3 Congress as a Model of Control 
Scholarship regarding the bureaucracy can provide insights for judicial decision making 
as the two institutions have similar structures and oversight in regards to procedural rulemaking. 
Just as Congress has delegated its authority to the judiciary to promulgate rules of procedure, 
Congress has similarly delegated its authority to the bureaucracy to promulgate rules and 
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regulations. Because this auspicious oversight is similar, theories regarding Congressional 
oversight of the bureaucracy are instructive in studying judicial decision making. I use literature 
explaining bureaucratic oversight to theorize that Congress is able to curb judicial discretion 
when courts apply procedural rules. 
 Agencies possess knowledge and expertise in their requisite areas and, therefore, 
Congress delegates its legislative power to the bureaucracy to promulgate rules and regulations. 
Congress, acting as the principal, imposes monitoring mechanisms to ensure that its agent, the 
bureaucracy, will not stray too far from its preferences. McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) present 
a theory of Congressional oversight by explaining it in terms of police patrols and fire alarms. 
Police patrols entail direct oversight; the principal proactively audits the agent (97). However, 
oversight by a fire alarm is indirect oversight as it establishes procedures encouraging third 
parties to alert the principal when the agent strays from the principal’s directives (97).  
In order to limit agency loss, principals devise mechanisms to limit the discretion of an 
agent (Shipan 1997, 7-8). This is important because as McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1989) 
show, once the policy preference is moved it is very difficult for the coalition enacting the policy 
to return the policy to its original position. Shipan notes that this principle applies when a court 
or an agency moves the policy. He further argues that there are actors who may prefer the new 
policy to the old policy and will therefore act to impede the majority’s ability to return to the old 
policy. Furthermore, bureaucratic oversight in the form of reducing budgets and enacting 
legislation is costly (Balla 1998).  
Scholars have argued that the most effective mechanism for oversight is implementing 
procedures (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987). Congress enacted the APA to establish 
bureaucratic oversight without incurring the costs of direct monitoring. According to McCubbins 
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et al., procedures can reduce the costs of obtaining information from the agent by equipping 
requisite constituents with vested interests to monitor agencies. They further theorize that 
political officials seek outcomes that are favorable to their constituents. They argue that the 
Administrative Procedure Act creates an environment that simulates political pressures that 
constrain agency policy making and render agencies more likely to render a decision according 
to the principal’s preferences.  
Agencies must provide notice of a proposed rule or regulation and a period for public 
comment, publicize the proposal to solicit participation from a wide variety of interests, render 
decisions based on the evidence and provide a rationalization for the decision. McCubbins et al. 
further argue that these procedures curb agency discretion by making its decision-making 
process public. Agencies cannot promulgate rules in secret. Also, a public rulemaking process 
forces agencies to consider political interests by involving interest groups to create an 
opportunity to comment. Interest groups have greater incentives to become more involved if the 
proposed rule has political implications. Therefore, groups with similar interests of those in 
Congress will be represented. Accordingly, those groups will provide political information for 
the agency to consider. The open structure of the process allows Congress, as the principal, to 
more easily acquire information. McCubbins et al. argue that agencies preferences are curbed 
because agencies no longer have information advantage to render decisions that are most 
favorable to the agency. Because information is public, interest groups have an incentive to 
“sound the alarm” when preferences stray too far from Members of Congress or the President. 
Accordingly, Congress “stack[s] the deck in favor of constituents who are the intended 
beneficiaries of the bargain struck by the coalition which created the agency” (McCubbins et al., 
261).  
32 
Bureaucratic scholars (i.e., Epstein and O’Hallaron (1994)) find empirical support for the 
notion that agencies are responsive to Congressional preferences. Weingast and Moran (1983) 
argue that Congress and in particular, Congressional committees, have a strong influence on 
bureaucratic outcomes. According to the Congressional Dominance Theory, Congress imposes 
controls, such as administrative procedures, to create an incentive for bureaucratic actors to align 
themselves with Congressional preferences. Shipan (2004) finds empirical evidence that, under 
certain conditions, the Food and Drug Administration renders decisions that are responsive to 
Congressional preferences: as the Congressional committee becomes more liberal, the agency 
becomes more activist. Likewise, as the committee becomes more conservative, the agency 
becomes less activist. Agency preferences are constrained when committee preferences are 
opposite of the agency.
1
  
Just as the APA solves the problem of asymmetry of information with regards to 
bureaucratic oversight, the Rules Enabling Act solves a similar problem. Congress has delegated 
some of its legislative powers to the federal courts, particularly its authority to promulgate the 
Rules of Practice and Procedure, just as Congress has delegated legislative powers to 
bureaucracy agencies. Because Congress has delegated its authority to the federal judiciary, it 
has devised a similar mechanism, the Rules Enabling Act, for Congressional oversight. The 
structure of the Rules Enabling Act is similar to the APA. Both Acts have provisions that open 
its rulemaking process to the public. The notice and comment period of the Rules Enabling Act 
is structured so that constituents will be more likely to “sound the alarm” if the institution strays 
too far from the preferences of its principal, Congress (McCubbins et al. 1987). Because 
                                                 
1
 Scholars have debated the influence of the President versus Congress. See Woods and Waterman (1991) finding 
evidence that bureaucracies are subject to both presidential and Congressional control. However, Moe (1987)  that 
congressional-dominance theorists ignore the role of the president and his powers as head of the executive branch 
(i.e., appointment of agency heads, agency budgets, etc…). 
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bureaucratic scholarship has shown that the APA acts as a constraint for bureaucratic outcomes, I 
expect the Rules Enabling Act to likewise constrain judicial preferences. My expectation is 
grounded on the aforementioned theories explaining bureaucratic control. Just as Congress is 
able to control bureaucratic outcomes by aligning similar interests via the APA, I argue that 
Congress controls judicial outcomes regarding procedural rules via the Rules Enabling Act. I 
argue that federal circuit courts are particularly aware of Congressional preferences because any 
adverse action can place in peril federal courts’ ability to control their judicial agendas. I also 
argue that federal circuit courts are keenly aware of who sits on the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees (see Eskridge 1991b), because these committees act as gatekeepers having 
jurisdiction over any bills seeking to amend the Federal Rules. Unlike statutes governing a 
specific subject matter where scholars have found that circuit courts are not responsive (see 
Revesz (2001); Hume (2009)), procedural rules cover all aspects of litigation. For example, Rule 
11 governs all pleadings in civil litigation. Accordingly, any legislation seeking to limit or 
expand the discretion of federal courts in Rule 11 sanctions applies to litigation in all practice 
areas and, therefore, would substantially curb judicial discretion in all areas. Because any 
retaliation from Congress can significantly hinder federal courts’ ability to control their appellate 
jurisdiction, federal courts are acutely attuned to Congressional preferences. Furthermore, I do 
not expect to find that circuit courts are responsive to Supreme Court preferences, as Klein and 
Hume (2003) find that circuit courts are not more likely to decide “cert. worthy” cases in 
conformance with Supreme Court preferences. However, I do expect to find that circuit courts 
are responsive to the ideology of the Judicial Conference as it serves as a gatekeeper for 
proposals seeking to amend the Federal Rules.   
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2.4 Hypotheses 
Judges render decisions according to their personal policy preferences. The application of 
procedural rules can have ideological implications as illustrated in the discussion regarding Rule 
11. Amendments to the Rule have been highly politicized with Republicans seeking to limit 
plaintiffs’ claims by requiring mandatory sanctions when a violation has occurred. Galanter 
(1974) argues that individuals are disadvantaged when litigating against the government and 
businesses because they lack resources and incentive to create a sustained litigation strategy. 
Later empirical research confirms that individuals are in fact disadvantaged (Songer and Sheehan 
1992, Songer et al. 2000; Kaheny 2010). I expect that individuals are further disadvantaged when 
litigating against businesses as conservatives have traditionally favored business interests 
(Howard and Brazelton 2014 forthcoming). Accordingly, I expect that conservative circuit 
panels will rule against individuals in decisions appealing sanctions under Rule 11. Therefore,  
H1: Conservative panels are more likely than liberal panels to rule against individual 
litigants in an appeal challenging a Rule 11 sanction.  
Because scholarship has shown that federal courts are responsive to Members who sit on 
Congressional committees (Eskridge 1991b). However, scholarship shows that agencies as well 
as other actors are many times responsive not to Congress as a whole, but rather to the 
committees with jurisdiction on the particular issue (Eskridge 1991b). Here, the House and 
Senate Judiciary Committees have jurisdiction over bills seeking to amend the Rules, and so the 
composition of these committees may influence judicial decision making. Therefore, I expect the 
following:   
H2a: As the ideology of the House Judiciary Committee becomes more conservative, the 
individual is less likely to prevail on a Rule 11 sanction.  
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H2b: As the ideology of the Senate Judiciary Committee becomes more conservative, the 
individual is less likely to prevail on a Rule 11 sanction.  
While these are the committees with jurisdiction over amending the Rules, the Chairs of 
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees act as gatekeepers for all bills introduced seeking to 
amend those Rule; the Chairs thus have the power to essentially kill a bill by never scheduling it 
for a hearing or markup (Oleszek 2013). As a result, the ideology of the Chair alone may 
influence how judges decide Rule 11 cases. Therefore, I expect:  
H3a:  As the ideology of the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee becomes more 
conservative, individuals are less likely to win.  
H3b:  As the ideology of the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee becomes more 
conservative, individuals are less likely to win.  
2.5 Data and Methods 
Data for this project was collected by examining cases published in Lexis/Nexis 
Academic. I coded cases from 1980 to 2005 for the First through Eleventh Federal Courts of 
Appeals and the D.C. Court of Appeals. I searched for all cases that included the term “Rule 11” 
and “Civil Procedure.”  The dataset includes all published and unpublished cases where a party 
appealed the decision of the district court finding a violation of Rule 11 or where a party 
appealed the denial of their Rule 11 motion seeking to find the opposing party in violation. 
Given my interest in understanding how circuit courts treat individual plaintiffs, I included only 
cases involving individuals and businesses, for an overall N of 307. 
My dependent variable is whether the individual won the appeal. I coded “1” if the 
individual won and “0” if the individual lost. My independent variables include the median 
ideology of the circuit court panel. I used the Giles, Hettinger, and Pepper nominate scores (GHP 
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scores) for this project (Giles et al. 2001). The GHP scores are an ideological measure of judges 
who sit on the Federal Courts of Appeals. Giles, Hettinger and Peppers use the Poole (1998, 
2009) and Rosenthal Common Space scores of the nominating Senator, considering the strong 
influence of senatorial courtesy. If one home-state Senator is from the president’s party, the 
Senator’s Common Space score is used. If both home-state senators are from the president’s 
party, the average of the two scores is used. Finally, if the judge is from a state where there is no 
Senator who is a member of the president’s party, the president’s score is used. Because there are 
many vacancies on the Courts of Appeals, many of those vacancies are filled with district court 
judges who sit on circuit court panels by designation. Accordingly, I used Christina Boyd’s 
ideology measures of district court judges for those judges who sat by designation (Boyd 2010). 
To ascertain the ideology of the district court judge, she used the method employed by Giles, 
Hettinger, and Peppers (2001) and the extension by Epstein, Martin, Segal, and Westerland 
(2007). Additionally, I controlled for the median ideology of the Judicial Conference using each 
member’s GHP score as this Conference acts as a gatekeeper submitting recommendations for 
amendments to the Rules. I controlled for the ideology of the Supreme Court by using the 
median judicial common space score for the Court. I control for the ideology of the Supreme 
Court because it has power to reverse decisions of circuit courts. Although some scholarship has 
found that circuit court panels are not responsive to Supreme Court (Klein and Hume 2003), 
other scholarship has shown that circuit courts follow Supreme Court mandates (Songer et al. 
1994). I also controlled for the influence of Congress by using the median Poole and Rosenthal 
Common Space scores for the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, their respective Chairs.
2
  
I also controlled for the president as he has the power to veto legislation passed by Congress. I 
                                                 
2
 (See Epstein et al. (2007) using a bridging method placing common space scores on the same scale; see also Bailey 
and Chang (2001) using a similar method.) 
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estimated a probit model because the dependent variable is dichotomous. For all independent 
variables, I measured the distance of the median ideology of panel to each of the independent 
variables by subtracting the absolute value of the median ideology of the panel from the absolute 
value of the ideology of the requisite independent variable. Also, in this model I used robust 
standard errors and clustered on the circuit to account for the possibility that residuals may not be 
independent within each circuit. Therefore, my model provides as follows: 
Sanction = β0 + β1 Panel Ideology + β2 Circuit Median + β3 Judicial Conference + 
β4 Supreme Court + β5 House Judiciary Committee + β6 Senate Judiciary  
Committee + β7 House Chair + β8 Senate Chair + β9 President + ε 
2.6 Results and Discussion 
The summary statistics are below in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Individual Winning .375 .48 0 1 
Panel Ideology .067 .289 -.532 .559 
Circuit Median .063 .182 -.385 .507 
Judicial Conference  .113 .166 -.290 .530 
Supreme Court .145 .154 -.188 .462 
House Judiciary Cmt -.030 .166 -.405 .366 
Senate Judiciary Cmt .098 .163 -.274 .556 
House Chair -.116 .422 -.449 .659 
Senate Chair -.095 .342 -.470 .407 
President -.328 .185 -.715 .087 
     
 
Table 2.1 shows that individuals won at a rate of 38 percent, providing some evidence 
that individuals are disadvantaged when litigating against businesses. Businesses have superior 
resources and incentive to carry out a sustained litigation strategy. However, if judicial ideology 
does not influence Rule 11 decisions, individual litigants should be equally disadvantaged when 
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litigating before liberal and conservative panels. The results of the probit model testing my 
theory are presented in Table 2.2.  
Table 2.2: Probit Model of the Individual Winning  
 
Table 2.2: Probit Model of the Individual Winning 
Variable Coefficient  Standard Error 
Panel Ideology -.854*   (.299) 
Circuit Median -.433    (.514) 
Judicial Conference     1.721*    (.806) 
Supreme Court -1.162 (1.005) 
House Judiciary Cmt 6.444    (3.820) 
Senate Judiciary Cmt -4.178 (3.005) 
House Chair -2.161*    (.978) 
Senate Chair  -1.421 (1.443) 
Constant -.283 (.324) 
N=307        Log Likelihood = -190.940 * = p > .05;  χ 2 = 72.64* 
 
 
As hypothesized, the median ideology of the panel has a statistically significant effect on 
the likelihood of the panel ruling in favor of the individual when litigating against a business. 
These results indicate that I can reject the null hypothesis. The results provide support that the 
more conservative the panel, the less likely the panel will rule in favor of the individual. 
However, probit coefficients do not provide information regarding the effects of the magnitude 
of the independent variable (Zelner 2009). In order to ascertain the magnitude, I estimate the 
predicted probability of the individual winning. The results of that estimation are presented in 
Table 2.3.  
Table 2.3: Predicted Probability of the Individual Winning by Panel 
Table 2.3: Predicted Probability of the Individual Winning by Panel 
Panel Ideology Probability Confidence Intervals 
Mean .36 (.33,    .38) 
Minimum .57 (.41,    .72) 
Maximum .22 (.15,    .29) 
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This estimation is constructed with a 95 percent confidence interval with all variables 
except Panel Ideology held at their mean. When Panel Ideology is held at its mean, the likelihood 
of the individual winning a Rule 11 appeal is 36 percent. However, when Panel Ideology is held 
at its minimum, i.e., when the panel is most liberal, the likelihood of the individual winning 
increases to 57 percent. When Panel Ideology is held at its maximum, i.e., when the panel is 
most conservative, the probability of the individual winning decreases to 22 percent. The 
confidence intervals indicate that the results of this estimation are statistically significant. 
Estimating first differences, the individual is 34 percent less likely to win as the ideology of the 
panel changes from minimum to maximum. The results of this estimation are depicted in Figure 
2.1 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1:  First Differences of Panel Ideology & the Likelihood of the Individual Winning 
 
Figure 2.1: First Differences of Panel Ideology & the Likelihood of the Individual Winning 
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When individuals litigate against businesses, conservatives are more likely to find that 
individual litigants violated Rule 11 and are susceptible to dismiss their case on the grounds that 
the claims are frivolous. The evidence suggests that conservative panels are sanctioning 
individuals because of their status. This places individuals at a substantial disadvantage in the 
litigation process when they litigate against businesses. Galanter’s theory provides that 
individuals are disadvantaged because they often lack resources to hire better attorneys, do not 
have the incentive to maintain the high costs of sustained litigation, and lack long-term goals of 
shaping legal precedent to their advantage. My results provide evidence that individuals are 
disadvantaged not only because of their status, but also because their status prompts ideological 
decision-making that is detrimental when litigating before a conservative panel. The substantive 
implications are important for individual litigants. Adverse decisions against individual litigants 
prevent them from “having their day in court” because the merits of their claims are not 
addressed. If conservative panels are more likely to uphold a Rule 11 sanction for individual 
litigants and, therefore,  prevent a court from hearing the merits of the case, then business 
litigants are not only able to shape precedent, but may also deter individual litigants from filing 
lawsuits in jurisdictions with conservative panels or from filing lawsuits altogether.  
The hypotheses testing the effects of Congress have mixed results. First, I fail to reject 
the null hypotheses regarding the effects of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. The 
third hypotheses regarding the Chairs of those committees also have mixed results, with no effect 
found for the ideology of the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee. However, I do find that 
as the ideological distance between the House Judiciary Committee Chair and the circuit panel 
grows, the individual is less likely to win.  
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Table 2.4: Predicted Probability of the Individual Winning by House Chair 
Table 2.4: Predicted Probability of the Individual Winning by House Chair 
House Chair Ideology Probability Confidence Intervals 
Median .36    (0.33,    0.38) 
Minimum .76 (0.46,    1.05) 
Maximum .11    (-0.04,    0.25) 
   
 
The estimation of the predicted probability is presented in Table 2.4. This estimation is 
also constructed with a 95 percent confidence interval with all variables except House Chair held 
at their mean. When House Chair is held at its median, the likelihood of the individual winning a 
Rule 11 appeal is 36 percent. However, when House Chair is held at its minimum, i.e., when the 
panel is most liberal, the likelihood of the individual winning increases to 76 percent. When 
Panel Ideology is held at its maximum, i.e., when the panel is most conservative, the probability 
of the individual winning decreases to 11 percent. The confidence intervals indicate that the 
results of the estimation holding House Chair at its median and minimum are statistically 
significant, but the estimation holding House Chair at its maximum is not statistically significant. 
These results may be a reflection of House Republicans’ activity in this area. House 
Republicans have been introducing legislation seeking to amend Rule 11 to discourage trial 
lawyers from filing claims that may be considered frivolous. If an attorney was unsure whether 
their arguments are grounded in law, they would be discouraged from asserting novel arguments 
on their plaintiffs’ behalf because they would not want to risk a court finding that their “novel” 
arguments was in fact frivolous.  
Furthermore, the Chair is a powerful gatekeeper for bills introduced. This finding lends 
some support for the theory that circuit courts are responsive agents of their principal, namely 
Congress. This finding also lends some support for the deck-stacking theory providing that the 
Rules Enabling Act sufficiently influences the outcome of judicial decisions. Because of the 
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unique provisions of the Rules Enabling Act which subject the Federal Rules of Practice and 
Procedure to Congressional review and public scrutiny, circuit courts may be particularly 
receptive to changes in Congressional ideology, namely the Chair of the House Judiciary 
Committee, in order to prevent a Congressional action incongruent with their preferences.  
2.7 Conclusion 
The models provide evidence that circuit panels transform its mandatory appellate 
jurisdiction into one that is discretionary by deciding procedural rules to set their judicial 
agendas.  The evidence provides that the ideology of the circuit panel has a significant effect on 
the likelihood of a litigant’s success, depending on the litigant’s status. Particularly, conservative 
panels are more likely to rule against individual litigants when appealing the grant or denial of a 
Rule 11 sanction. These results have significant implications for granting litigants access to the 
courts. Courts have power to dismiss a litigant’s claim as a sanction pursuant to Rule 11. In 
certain instances, a court can dismiss a litigant’s claim seeking relief with prejudice, thus barring 
the litigant from litigating the merits of that claim. Consequently, these issues often present an 
absolute bar, preventing a court from deciding the case. Accordingly, the litigant can never 
obtain redress from his or her grievances. As a result, the implications of a court declining to 
reach the merits of a litigant’s claim are immense. A litigant is without recourse in the judicial 
system if a court refuses to hear their claim. Because of this, a litigant’s ability to comply with 
procedural rules is of the uttermost importance.  
Furthermore, there is some support that circuit panels are responsive to changes in the 
ideology of Congress. While circuit panels seem not to respond to Congress as a whole, the 
evidence suggests that circuit panels render decisions based on the ideology of the Chair of the 
House Judiciary Committee. Given that the House Judiciary Committee is likely the principal 
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gatekeeper for bills seeking to amend Rule 11, these results indicate that circuit panels are 
cognizant of Congress’s power to override their decisions. More broadly, these results suggest 
that federal judges do take into account Congressional preferences, thus constraining their ability 
to freely decide according to their sincere policy preferences.   
In the next chapter, I examine whether federal circuit courts set their judicial agendas by 
transforming their mandatory appellate jurisdiction into one that is discretionary by deciding 
cases on jurisdictional grounds. Particularly, I examine whether federal circuit courts achieve this 
goal in controlling access by rendering decisions to grant or deny motions seeking to certify a 
class in civil rights class action lawsuits. I seek to demonstrate how federal courts deny 
certification to control which litigants obtain access to the courts on a class-wide scale.  
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3 CHAPTER 3: JURISDICTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CERTIFICATION 
DECISIONS IN CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS 
3.1 Introduction 
In 1994, Wal-Mart hired Betty Dukes as a cashier earning a wage of $5 an hour. After 
five years of no advancement, she decided to sue Wal-Mart for discrimination on the basis of her 
gender. She, along with six other named plaintiffs, sued Wal-Mart as a class, alleged that Wal-
Mart discriminated against women by denying promotions and providing wages at a lower rate 
than men. Wal-Mart challenged the certification of the class, alleging that their complaints did 
not specifically allege the wrongs committed by Wal-Mart and that the potential class was too 
large to certify. A federal district court certified the class and the Ninth Circuit upheld the district 
court’s decision. Wal-Mart then appealed the decision certifying the class to the Supreme Court.  
In a split 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that a group of women comprised of 
potentially 1.5 million plaintiffs was too large to certify as a class in an employment 
discrimination claim. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, stated that the plaintiffs could not 
prove that Wal-Mart had a corporate-wide policy of discrimination in pay or promotion, and that 
the potential of class of 1.5 million women was too numerous to set forth a common claim of 
gender discrimination needed for class certification. All of the conservatives of the Court joined 
the majority opinion in favor of Wal-Mart, while the liberals of the Court dissented. In response 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dukes, Senator Al Franken (D-MN) and Rep. Rosa DeLauro 
(D-CT) introduced the Equal Employment Opportunity Restoration Act of 2012 to overturn the 
decision by conferring jurisdiction to the federal courts for class action lawsuits having a large 
number of plaintiffs.  
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The Dukes decision practically denied 1.5 million potential plaintiffs the opportunity to 
gain access to the courts. The vast majority of potential plaintiffs are very unlikely to hire an 
attorney to bring a discrimination claim against Wal-Mart, as they lack the time and resources to 
pursue their individual claims. Therefore, most of these 1.5 million women will never obtain 
even the possibility of seeking redress from the alleged discrimination committed by Wal-Mart. 
This case highlights the research question I address in this chapter: Do federal courts use the 
jurisdictional threshold issues to control access to the courts?  
In this chapter, I theorize that federal circuit courts use class certification to control 
access to the judicial system. Specifically, I argue conservative panels seek to control access by 
denying potential plaintiffs class certification. Because conservatives favor business interests, I 
argue that conservative panels are more likely to deny certification to potential plaintiffs. 
However, courts do not decide cases in a vacuum; I argue that federal circuit courts are 
responsive to changes in Congress’s ideology. Because Congress possesses the ability to expand 
or restrict federal court jurisdiction, I argue that federal panels are responsive to Congressional 
preferences. First, I discuss of the jurisdiction of the federal courts and class action lawsuits. 
Next, I provide a review of the literature regarding the jurisdiction of the courts, and then 
explicate my theory and hypotheses. Finally, I present my empirical tests, examining all 
employment discrimination cases between 1980 and 2000 where circuit courts considered 
motions to certify a class and permitted a class action suit to proceed.  
3.2 Jurisdiction, Congress and Courts 
 Constitutionally, federal courts can only hear cases that arise under their jurisdiction. In 
order for a federal court to adjudicate a case, a court must have subject-matter jurisdiction over 
the claim. Pursuant to Article III, Congress has the power to establish, modify, remove, or add to 
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the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts but for the original jurisdiction conferred to 
the Supreme Court pursuant to the Constitution. Subject-matter jurisdiction gives federal courts 
power to adjudicate cases on two grounds: jurisdiction by federal question or by diversity  
(Baude 2007).  
Pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, Congress has the power to determine the areas 
of law that raise a federal question and, therefore, confers jurisdiction over those areas to the 
federal courts. Recently, Congress has used its powers controlling the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts that raise a federal question for political reasons. Members of Congress have introduced 
bills seeking to strip the jurisdiction of the federal courts in cases pertaining to the 
constitutionality of the pledge of allegiance, certain abortion cases, and marriage (see Mayer-
Cesiano 2006; Miller 2009). Congress’s most recent action regarding removing federal courts’ 
jurisdiction is in the area of military law. In response to recent decisions by the Supreme Court, 
Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006, stripping the jurisdiction of federal 
courts from hearing habeas corpus petitions from enemy combatants. It responded to the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004) and Rasul v. Bush (2004), holding that 
detainees and U.S. citizens who were held at Guantanamo Bay had a right to petition for habeas 
corpus relief.  
Article III also provides federal courts with power to adjudicate cases under the diversity 
jurisdiction, which constitutes controversies “between Citizens of different states,” and grants 
Congress the power to determine its requirements. Specifically, Congress through the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 specified the requirements of diversity jurisdiction, conferring to the federal 
judiciary jurisdiction over cases involving residents from different states (Baude 2007). Plaintiffs 
and defendants must be domiciled in different states and they must meet the requirement for the 
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amount in controversy, which is set by Congress. That is, parties can litigate claims that only 
implicate a cause of action arising under state law if the requirements for diversity jurisdiction 
are met. Over the years, Congress has modified the domiciliary requirements and has increased 
the amount in controversy, which is presently $75,000. When a state law claim is implicated, 
parties may remove the case from state court to litigate the claim in a federal court. The principle 
supporting diversity jurisdiction provides that litigants have a neutral forum to litigate their state 
law claims and no litigant will enjoy a “home-state advantage” by litigating against an out-of-
state party in the litigant’s home state.  
3.3 Class Action Lawsuits in Federal Courts 
 Because Congress controls the jurisdiction of the federal courts, Congress controls the 
jurisdictional boundaries of class action lawsuits. Generally, federal courts have jurisdiction to 
adjudicate class action lawsuits if the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are met or if the 
plaintiff presents a claim arising under federal law. Class action lawsuits permit the consolidation 
claims of all plaintiffs presenting similar claims against a defendant. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there are four elements that federal courts must consider when 
plaintiffs file motions seeking certification. First, the potential class must satisfy the numerosity 
requirement. According to the Rule, a class may be certified if the members of the class are so 
numerous that treating them as co-plaintiffs in a traditional lawsuit is impractical. Second, there 
must be common questions of law and fact among members of the class. Next, the claims or 
defenses of the representatives of the class action must be typical of members of the class. Last, 
the representative parties of the class action lawsuit must fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of the class (Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P.). 
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Class actions originated in courts of equity to more efficiently adjudicate a number of 
similar claims. The procedural mechanism was codified as Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 1938 shortly after the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act (Rabiej 2004). The 
Supreme Court amended Rule 23 in 1966, promulgating a number of changes. First, the Rule 
was amended to provide greater judicial discretion in certifying lawsuits as class actions. Prior to 
this amendment, federal courts could certify class actions only if the numerosity, commonality of 
law and fact, typicality of claims, and fairness of adjudication as a class action were met (See 
Rule 23(a), Fed. R. Civ. Pro). The amendment to the Rule provided a catch-all provision, which 
states that courts can certify a class if plaintiffs present common questions of law and fact, and if 
a class action is a superior method of adjudicating claims (see Rule 23(b)(B)(3), Fed. R. Civ. 
Pro). Legal scholars argue that the purpose of the amendment was to facilitate greater access to 
the courts for plaintiffs who otherwise would not meet the requirements pursuant to Rule 23(a) 
(Burbank 2005). The Rule was specifically amended to provide a greater opportunity for civil 
rights claimants to file class action lawsuits (Frymer 2003).  
While the Supreme Court amended Rule 23 to expand potential plaintiffs’ ability to bring 
class action lawsuits, the Court limited access in Zahn v. International Paper Company (1973). 
In Zahn, the Supreme Court held that all members of a class action lawsuit were required to meet 
the amount in controversy requirement pursuant to the requirements of diversity jurisdiction. As 
with the vote in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the vote was divided on ideological lines with three liberals 
of the Court dissenting. Plaintiffs who did not meet the amount in controversy, which was 
$10,000 at the time of Zahn, could not join the class. The impact of this decision severely limited 
the plaintiffs’ ability to bring lawsuits as they were each required to file a lawsuit as an 
individual plaintiff. In 1990, Congress codified the Supreme Court’s decision in Zahn. Congress 
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passed with President George H.W. Bush’s signature, the Jurisdiction Improvements Act which, 
in part, provided that federal courts could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction in class action 
lawsuits over claims that did not meet the requirement for the amount in controversy (Murphy 
1995).  
Another important amendment to Rule 23 occurred in 1998, when the Supreme Court 
amended the Rule to permit interlocutory appeals for decisions regarding class certifications. 
Ordinarily, appellate courts do not have jurisdiction over cases appealed from a non-final 
judgment. Generally, a court must decide all issues presented in order for a litigant to appeal the 
judgment. Because the issue of class certification generally is a threshold issue,
3
 the Rules 
required courts to rule on a certification motion and adjudicate the merits of a claim before a 
litigant could appeal the ruling on class certification. In 1998, the Supreme Court amended the 
Rules rendering rulings on class certifications interlocutory and, therefore, permitting litigants to 
appeal the ruling before a decision is made on the merits of a claim (Rabiej 2004).  
In 2003, the Supreme Court again amended Rule 23 permitting courts to certify a class 
any time before a final judgment is rendered on the merits. Second, the Rule was amended to 
allow plaintiffs to request certification of a class if there were common issues of fact. Other 
amendments to the Rule did not affect certification. As a result of these amendments, plaintiffs 
were aided in their ability to meet the requirements and the number of class actions grew at a fast 
                                                 
3
 In a study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, they examined motions seeking class certification in federal 
district courts. According to this study, courts often rule on the merits of a case along with a determination on the 
issue of class certification. In fact, the study finds that certification of a class action is a type of intermediate 
procedural ruling. In its study of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 80 percent of motions to 
dismiss were decided before the motion to certify. In its analysis of four federal district courts, 20 percent of motions 
for summary judgment were ruled on before a certification ruling and, in one district court, 67 percent of motions for 
summary judgment were ruled on before a determination on certification.  
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rate. Federal courts did not take kindly to the growth of class actions. Class actions sometimes 
present complex legal questions which utilize scare judicial resources (Purcell 2008). According 
to a study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center examining securities class action lawsuits, 
class actions consume three times as many judicial resources than a traditional lawsuit (Willging 
et al. 1996).  
Some evidence provides that class action lawsuits were more beneficial to trial attorneys 
than members of the class. Particularly, attorneys reaped the majority of the benefits of class 
action litigation by incurring large attorney’s fees with little compensation remaining for the 
members of the class. Empirical evidence shows that in consolidated cases, juries are more likely 
to confer higher awards when there is one plaintiff who joined the lawsuit that was severely 
injured (Bordens and Horowitz 1989). This provides evidence that juries are more likely to grant 
higher awards to all members of a class only if there is a small number of plaintiffs who suffered 
a serious injury. Some argue that class action lawsuits provide a windfall for attorneys who 
collect millions of dollars in attorney’s fees while leaving members of the class with nominal 
awards.  
 Others perceive class action lawsuits as a threat to business interests. Richard Posner, a 
judge sitting on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, calls class action lawsuits “blackmail 
settlements” due to a company’s potential risk of a judicial determination finding it liable for all 
members of a class (Schwartz 2000, 490). Therefore, corporations would be less likely to 
proceed to trial to avoid the risk of an unfavorable settlement in a class action lawsuit. Even 
more, the threat of filing a lawsuit could be used as a coercive tool pressuring corporate 
defendants to settle. Therefore, certifying the class is an essential step for trial attorneys. More 
importantly, plaintiff’s attorneys sought to litigate in state court, where they often found a more 
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favorable forum. In order to circumvent the requirements of diversity jurisdiction, attorneys 
added litigants who were residents of the same state as the defendant, negating the diversity of 
all litigants which is required for a court to obtain subject-matter jurisdiction over state-law 
claims (Purcell 2008). When Congress conferred citizenship to corporations, they began 
removing cases to federal courts for litigation that were sympathetic to their claims. Corporations 
use the mechanism of removal to gain a strategic advantage in litigation. When corporations 
removed cases to federal courts, plaintiffs would drop their claims anticipating an adverse 
decision in federal court (Curry 2007). Congress sought to rectify the perceived problems that 
arose with these lawsuits.  
In 2004, Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act, which modified the original 
jurisdiction of the federal courts conferring multi-state class action litigation to the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts regardless of the diversity of the parties subject to the litigation. Before the 
Act, federal courts had power to adjudicate class action lawsuits under the normal rules 
governing diversity jurisdiction, which required the named class plaintiffs and defendants to be 
domiciled in different states. Furthermore, the Act confers diversity jurisdiction in class action 
lawsuits where total amount in controversy is $5 million or more. Additionally, federal courts 
must exercise jurisdiction over class action lawsuits where one-third or less of the members of 
the class reside in the same state as the defendant, must decline jurisdiction when two-thirds or 
more of the members share the defendant’s domicile, and has discretion to exercise jurisdiction 
when more than one-third but less than two-third of the members are domiciled in the 
defendant’s state.  
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3.4 Empirical Scholarship Examining Congress, Courts and Class Action Lawsuits 
 Scholarship regarding the jurisdiction of the federal courts has been scarce. Much of the 
scholarship regarding the jurisdiction of the federal courts has focused on Congress. Congress 
controls the jurisdiction of the federal courts by a number of mechanisms. First, Congress can 
control the number of federal judgeships. Scholars have provided evidence that as the caseload 
of the federal courts increases, Congress increases the number of judgeships to accommodate for 
the increase number of cases (DeFigueiredo and Tiller 1996). Congress is also responsive to 
legal constraints of the jurisdiction of the federal courts, as evidenced by limiting the courts’ 
diversity jurisdiction when caseload increases. Since diversity cases comprise of between 25 and 
30 percent of the federal courts’ docket, Congress is aware of the demands and constrains 
diversity cases place on the federal courts (Curry 2007). Historically, Congress has limited the 
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts instead of expanding it. This is evident, in part, by the 
increases in the amount in controversy from $10,000 in 1952; $50,000 in 1988; to $75,000 in 
1996 (Curry 2007). Increasing the amount in controversy limits the number of litigants who are 
able to meet the requisite amount and, therefore, restricts the number of defendants who are able 
to remove their case to federal court. Furthermore in 1978, a bill was introduced in the House to 
eliminate the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts (Purcell 2008). Not only does Congress 
modify the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts, Congress has sought to eliminate the diversity 
jurisdiction due to the burden that it places on federal courts. These findings indicate that 
Congress is responsive to the administrative needs of the federal courts to assist the courts in 
accommodating the increase in caseload.  
Not only does Congress respond to administrative considerations, empirical evidence 
shows that Congress uses the jurisdiction of the federal courts to achieve their political goals. 
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The evidence suggests that Congress uses jurisdiction as a tool to further its policy preferences. 
Scholars find that Congress increases the number of federal judgeships when Congress and the 
Presidency are politically aligned (DeFigueiredo and Tiller 1996). This provides evidence that 
Congress seeks to carry forth its policy goals by rendering it easier to appoint judges who are 
ideologically aligned with Congressional preferences. Congressional modification of the 
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts is premised on Congress’s belief that ideologically 
aligned judges will decide cases to conform to Congressional preferences. This evidence is also 
supported by Curry’s finding (2007) in testing the likelihood of the House passing legislation 
modifying diversity jurisdiction. He finds that as the workload and ideological distance between 
federal district court and the House increase, the likelihood of Congress limiting diversity 
jurisdiction increases. His findings indicate that Congress is seeking to limit the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts when the courts’ preferences are not ideologically congruent. By conferring 
power to ideologically aligned federal courts, Congress can further its political goals.  
However, little scholarship examines the courts’ use of jurisdiction to further their policy 
preferences. Legal scholars have provided qualitative evidence that the courts use rules regarding 
class action lawsuits in order to provide more access for potential plaintiffs. Frymer (2003) uses 
qualitative evidence of the federal courts’ power to use jurisdiction of the federal courts to 
integrate labor unions. First, he notes that Congress created to Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission to address discrimination in private companies, but failed to provide the EEOC with 
enforcement power. Because the EEOC lacked power, federal courts empowered private litigants 
by liberalizing class action requirements rendering it more favorable to bring a discrimination 
lawsuit against employers and unions. In fact, the EEOC only filed four percent of discrimination 
lawsuits against employers between 1972 and 1989 (Frymer 2003, 490; Donohue and Siegelman 
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1991, 1019). The EEOC did not have cease and desist powers, so individual litigants sued for a 
private right of action to enforce antidiscrimination laws against employers. During the time the 
EEOC lacked enforcement power, private attorneys filed class action lawsuits using federal 
statutes to enforce antidiscrimination laws.  
Other scholars have conducted empirical work studying the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts in the context of class action lawsuits. Fitzpatrick (2010) finds that the political affiliation 
of the judge has no statistically significant effect on the probability of a district court judge 
approving a higher fee award in class action settlements. However, Fitzpatrick does not test 
ideology but rather simply the partisanship of the judge by determining whether the judge was 
appointed by a Democratic or Republican president. Measuring partisanship instead of ideology 
is problematic because partisanship provides very little variability in the independent variable. 
Furthermore, Coffee and Paulovic (2007) use legal analysis examining the likelihood of class 
certification by circuits to conclude that the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits render liberal 
certification decisions and the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits render conservative 
certification decisions. They link the variation, in part, to different standards of review in 
decisions for certification. For instance, the Second Circuit reviews decisions granting 
certification under an abuse of discretion standard but reviews decisions denying certification de 
novo. Also, Coffee and Paulovic argue that the Ninth Circuit is more liberal regarding the 
requirement that potential class members share a common question of law and fact. They also 
argue that precedent of the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits is most restrictive regarding 
class certifications seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief, while the Second Circuit has 
interpreted precedent in a more liberal fashion permitting such certifications. Coffee and 
Paulovic find that over 40 percent of class actions were filed in the Second and Ninth Circuits 
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which indicates that attorneys are forum shopping, providing further anecdotal evidence that 
these circuits are friendly forums for those seeking class certification. The variation between 
liberal and conservative interpretations of Rule 23 could account for the variation in the number 
of class actions that are filed within the Courts of Appeals.
4
   
3.5 Theory: Jurisdiction and Class Action Lawsuits 
My study addresses the gap in the literature regarding federal circuit courts’ use of 
jurisdictional issues to control access. Because jurisdictional threshold issues can prevent certain 
litigants from accessing the courts, I argue that circuit courts use threshold issues to further their 
own policy preferences. They accomplish their goals by controlling certain parties’ ability to 
gain access to the courts. By controlling who can gain access, courts cannot only choose which 
cases it will hear on the merits, but discourage certain litigants from filing cases if litigants find 
that courts are unlikely to hear their case. Litigants want to avoid time-consuming and costly 
litigation if courts are unlikely to confer jurisdiction over their claims and render a decision on 
the merits. Therefore, judges can further their own policy preferences by controlling who can 
gain access. They are able to do so because Congress has delegated its authority to the federal 
courts to promulgate rules that implicate jurisdiction. However, unlike rules that are solely 
procedural but are promulgated by the federal courts, Congress controls the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts. Because Congress has not conferred sole power over jurisdictional issues, such as 
class certifications, federal courts are not as free to decide these cases according to their 
ideological preferences. However, because of legislative action seeking to limit the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts, I argue that federal circuit courts act strategically seeking to maximize their 
                                                 
4
 Other scholars have empirically examined class actions without considering the effects of ideology (See Eisenberg 
and Miller 2005 examining various methods of calculating attorney’s fee award; and Gande and Lewis 2009 
examining the probability of shareholders anticipating a class action lawsuit and its effect on the requisite industry). 
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policy preferences but within the confines of Congressional ideology. Circuit courts desire to do 
so to retain their power to set their own judicial agendas. Therefore, I examine the extent that 
federal circuit courts control their appellate jurisdiction by the grant or denial of class 
certification in the area of civil rights litigation. However, I must also test the alternative theory 
that circuit courts decide cases on the threshold ground of jurisdiction in order to conserve scarce 
judicial resources to address heavy caseloads (Willging et al. 1996). 
3.6 Hypotheses 
First, the federal courts seek to control their caseload. Federal courts must resolve 
disputes with increasingly large caseloads (Willging et al. 1996). One method of alleviating large 
caseloads is to deny certification of a class. As class action lawsuits demand up to three times as 
many judicial resources than a non-class action lawsuit, panels could deny certification in order 
to preserve scarce judicial resources. Therefore, my first hypothesis is as follows:  
H1: As the caseload of the circuit increases, the panel is more likely to deny a motion 
seeking class certification.  
Furthermore, panels could also control their appellate jurisdiction by attempting to deny 
access to certain litigants on a class-wide basis. Class action lawsuits afford relief to a large 
number of plaintiffs who do not have the resources, time, and/or interest in pursuing claims. As 
illustrated in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, courts can employ their ideology deny access to litigants whose 
position is ideologically incongruent to their own. As a result, courts can deny thousand of 
litigants relief. Particularly, conservatives can deny a potential class seeking relief for an alleged 
violation of civil rights by denying a motion to certify. Therefore, I hypothesize the following: 
H2: Conservative panels are more likely than liberal panels to rule against a litigant 
seeking class certification. 
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There is variation among circuit courts regarding standards of review for motions seeking 
class certification. Based on Coffee and Paulovic’s (2007) analysis, conservative circuits have a 
more stringent standard of review for class certifications than liberal circuits. Therefore, the 
likelihood that a circuit will grant or deny a motion seeking certification depends on the ideology 
of the circuit. Because these standards vary based on whether the circuit is liberal or 
conservative, panels may be constrained by that circuit’s certification precedent. That is, panels 
are not free to vote their sincere preferences for fear of en banc review (Clark 2009). 
Accordingly, the following is my third hypothesis:  
H3: Conservative circuits are more likely to deny certification to plaintiffs than liberal 
circuits.  
Additionally, Congress shapes the jurisdiction of the federal courts by controlling the 
cases courts hear through subject-matter jurisdiction and the litigants who may appear in court 
through diversity jurisdiction. Unlike procedural rules, the jurisdiction of the federal courts is 
solely controlled by Congress. Because the House and Senate Judiciary Committees control 
legislation seeking to modify the jurisdiction of the federal courts, I expect that  
H4: As the ideology of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees become more 
conservative, the class is less likely to win. 
3.7 Data and Methods 
 Data for this project was collected by reviewing cases published in Lexis/Nexis 
Academic. I coded cases from 1980 to 2000 for the First through Eleventh Federal Courts of 
Appeals and the D.C. Court of Appeals. I searched all cases that included the terms “appeal,” 
“grant,” “deny,” and “vacate” within the sentence of “class certification.” The dataset includes 
all cases where a party appealed the decision of the district court that granted or denied a motion 
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to certify a class in an employment discrimination lawsuit. Among these cases include alleged 
discrimination on the basis of race, gender, age and disability. The dataset includes all published 
and unpublished cases.  
My dependent variable is whether the plaintiffs seeking to certify the class won the 
appeal. I coded “1” if the class won and “0” if the class lost. My total N is 75 because I limit 
cases to appeals challenging certification in the area of employment discrimination. My 
independent variables include the caseload of the federal courts. I measure caseload as the 
number of cases that are assigned per active panel for each circuit. I also include the median 
ideology of the circuit court panel. As in the previous chapter, I use the Giles, Hettinger, and 
Pepper nominate scores (Giles et al. 2001) to measure the ideology of circuit court judges and 
the scores developed by Christina Boyd to measure district court judges for those who sat on 
circuit court panels by designation (Boyd 2010). I control for the ideology of the Supreme Court 
by using the median judicial common space score for the Court. I again control for the ideology 
of the Supreme Court because it has power to reverse decisions of circuit courts. As stated in 
Chapter 2, although some scholarship has found that circuit court panels are not responsive to 
Supreme Court (Klein and Hume 2003), other scholarship has shown that circuit courts follow 
Supreme Court mandates (Songer et al. 1994). I also controlled for the influence of Congress and 
the president by using the median Poole and Rosenthal Common Space scores for the House and 
Senate Judiciary Committees, and the president.
5
   I use a probit model as the dependent variable 
is dichotomous. Also, in this model I use robust standard errors clustered on circuit to account 
for the possibility that residuals may not be independent within each circuit. Thus, the following 
is my model: 
                                                 
5
 For all of these independent variables, I measured the ideological distance of the panel from the median ideology 
of the circuit, the Supreme Court, the Congressional variables, and the president.  
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Certification = β0 + β1 Panel Ideology + β2 Circuit Median + β3 Supreme Court + 
β4 House Judiciary Committee + β5 Senate Judiciary Committee + β6 President + 
β7 Caseload + ε 
3.8 Results and Discussion 
The summary statistics are presented in the table below. 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
Table 5: Summary Statistics 
Variable       Mean     Standard Dev.       Minimum      Maximum 
Class Winning .28 .45 0      1 
Panel Ideology .023        .234        -.532 .459 
Circuit Ideology .055 .230 -.52 .581 
Supreme Court .044 .091 -.106 .179 
House Jud. Cmt -.106 .238 -.277 .381 
Senate Jud. Cmt -.061 .150 -.221 .180 
President .241 .573 -.532 .693 
Caseload       776         364         328         2101 
     
 
The summary statistics show that the potential class won the appeal at a rate of 28 
percent. That is, when a litigant appealed a judgment denying or granting certification, the 
potential class won 28 percent of the time. The summary statistics provides some evidence that 
classes are disadvantaged when appealing a judgment challenging certification. However, 
plaintiffs seeking to certify a class should again be equally disadvantaged when litigating before 
liberal and conservative panels if judges are reviewing these appeals non-ideologically. The 
results of the probit model are presented in Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.2:  Probit Model of the Class Winning        
Table 6: Probit Model of the Class Winning 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Panel Ideology       .020 (.535) 
Circuit Median    -1.667* (.557) 
Supreme Court     3.399* (2.015) 
House Judiciary Cmt    -1.111 (2.253) 
Senate Judiciary Cmt    -2.287 (2.937) 
President      -.168 (.340) 
Caseload       .001 (.001) 
Constant    -1.748* (.700) 
N=78 χ 2 = 16.61* * = p > .05 
 
The model indicates that I can reject the null hypothesis for Hypothesis 3, which provides 
evidence that the ideology of the circuit court has a statistically significant effect on the 
likelihood of the potential class winning the appeal. As the median ideology of the entire circuit 
becomes more conservative, the potential class seeking certification is less likely to win the 
appeal. To understand the magnitude, I estimate the predicted probability of the potential class 
winning the appeal. The results of that estimation are presented in Table 3.3.  
 
Table 3.3:  Predicted Probability of the Class Winning 
 
Table 7: Predicted Probability of the Class Winning 
Circuit Ideology Probability Confidence Intervals 
Mean .26         (0.20,    0.32) 
Minimum .62         (0.36,    0.89) 
Maximum .06       (-0.01,    0.14) 
   
 
The estimation for the predicted probability of the class winning indicates that when the ideology 
of the circuit is held has its mean, the class has a 26 percent probability of winning. However, the 
probability significantly increases when the circuit is most liberal, where the class is 62 percent 
likely to prevail on appeal. When the circuit’s ideology is most conservative, the probability of 
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the class winning is 6 percent. The results indicate that the estimation holding Circuit Ideology at 
its mean and minimum are statistically significant, while Circuit Ideology held at its maximum is 
not statistically significant. Estimating first differences, the graph as depicted in Figure 3.1 
shows that the class is less likely to win as the ideology of the circuit changes from minimum to 
maximum.  
 
Figure 2: First Differences of Panel Ideology & the Likelihood of the Class Winning 
Figure 3.1:  First Differences of Panel Ideology & the Likelihood of the Class Winning 
The variation of the potential class winning an appeal challenging certification may be 
the result in differences in the standard of review for judgments on certifications within each 
circuit. Arguably, conservative circuits set precedent constraining panels’ ability to decide 
certification issues pursuant to their ideology. Therefore, a more stringent standard of review 
may constrain a panel’s ideological inclinations. This may explain the failure to reject the null 
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hypothesis for Hypothesis 2 as the coefficient for that hypothesis is not statistically significant. 
Further analysis is needed to ascertain whether variation among the standard of review for 
various circuits to explain why a potential class is less likely to win as the circuit becomes more 
conservative.  
Overall, these findings lend support that liberals want to grant potential class litigants 
access to the courts. Arguably, liberals are devising legal rules rendering easier to grant 
certification and, therefore, provide access to a larger number of plaintiffs who otherwise would 
be precluded from bringing an action to court. When a potential class seeks certification in an 
action against a business or corporation, the certification itself can be used as leverage prompting 
a corporation to settle a case to avoid the risk of an adverse judgment which could cost 
substantially more than a settlement. Therefore, liberal circuits are granting access to a large 
number of plaintiffs. The ramifications are important, since litigants could be encouraged or 
discouraged from bringing class actions based on the ideology of the circuit. This is supported by 
evidence that in 2004, the Second and Ninth Circuits received over 40 percent of all motions 
nationwide seeking class certification as these circuits are known for liberal certification 
requirements (Coffee and Paulovic 2007). Attorneys may thus forum shop to increase their 
chances of certification in more “friendly” circuits.  
The null hypotheses for the first, second, and fourth hypotheses cannot be rejected. The 
inability to reject the null hypotheses regarding the House and Senate Judiciary Committees is 
not entirely incongruent with previous scholarship. Many scholars have found that the federal 
courts of appeals are not responsive to changes in Congress’s ideology (See Revesz 2001; Hume 
2008). Although I find that the circuit courts are responsive to changes in the ideology of the 
House’s and Senate’s Judiciary Committees in my chapter examining procedural rules, I find no 
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similar results regarding class certifications. Circuit courts may believe that they have shielded 
themselves from potential Congressional retaliation by controlling certification decisions with 
stringent or lenient standards of review. Because these standards are the creation of the federal 
circuit courts via common-law, they may believe that Congress is unlikely to pose a threat. 
Furthermore, Circuit courts may be more responsive to the preferences of the Supreme Court 
because circuit courts control certification decisions according to that circuit’s standard of 
review. The Supreme Court could render a decision establishing the standard of review for all 
circuit courts. Therefore, circuit courts may be particularly attuned to Supreme Court 
preferences. However, the sign for the coefficient of the ideology of the Supreme Court variable 
is in the opposite direction for this explanation. As the ideology of the Supreme Court becomes 
more liberal, the panel is less likely to grant certification. Consequently, more research is 
necessary to understand this effect.     
3.9 Conclusion 
My findings provide evidence that circuit courts use threshold issues to control which 
litigants gain access to the courts. Although the evidence does not provide support that panels are 
controlling access via class certification, the evidence provides support that access is controlled 
at the circuit level. Circuits vary in their certification decisions, with conservative circuits more 
likely to deny access by ruling against class certification.  
The implications for the denial of class certification are vast. As demonstrated in        
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, a denial of a class certification has the potential to bar thousands of plaintiffs 
from bringing their claims to court. Although plaintiffs as individuals may sue a company, the 
likelihood of an individual plaintiff filing suit is low. The typical plaintiff does not have the 
incentive, time, and resources to sue a business or corporation (Galanter 1974). Because of these 
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disadvantages for individual litigants, the denial of class certification has the practical effects of 
precluding those litigants from litigating their claims in court.  
Furthermore, the evidence does not show that Congress influences certification decisions. 
There is no effect for changes in Congress’s ideology on class certification. Although there has 
been Congressional activity in this area, the findings are not inconsistent with previous 
scholarship finding that circuit courts are nonresponsive to changes in Congress’s ideology 
(Revesz 2001; Hume 2009). In this context, the evidence indicates that circuit ideology has the 
greatest effect on access rather than the ideology of Congress or a circuit court panel.  
In the next chapter, I examine whether federal circuit courts set their judicial agendas by 
transforming their mandatory appellate jurisdiction into one that is discretionary by deciding 
cases on justiciable grounds. Particularly, I examine whether federal circuit courts achieve this 
goal in controlling access by rendering decisions to grant or deny prudential standing to litigants 
seeking enforcement of the Fair Housing Act of 1968. I seek to examine whether federal circuit 
courts control which litigants obtain access to the courts in this regard.  
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4     CHAPTER 4: JUSTICIABLE IMPLICATIONS OF DECISIONS EXAMINING 
PRUDENTIAL STANDING 
4.1   Introduction 
   In 1962, Penfield, New York, passed a housing ordinance which allocated 98 percent of 
the town’s undeveloped land to single-family dwellings, setting minimum requirements for, 
among others things, lot size, floor space, and living space within each dwelling. Because of 
these requirements, low to moderate income individuals were unable to find housing because of 
the costs associated with building and/or purchasing such homes. Low-income plaintiffs sued, 
alleging a violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and arguing that the zoning ordinance had 
the effect of excluding them, who were disproportionally racial and ethnic minorities, from being 
able to afford housing within the town. Because the effects of the zoning ordinance rendered it 
difficult for low to moderate income individuals to find affordable housing in Penfield, they had 
to resort to finding affordable housing in nearby Rochester. Another class of plaintiffs, property 
owners as Rochester taxpayers, also sued, arguing that the City of Rochester was forced to 
provide affordable housing to individuals who could not find housing in Penfield. As a result, 
Rochester’s taxpayers carried the burden of providing housing for such individuals. The last 
plaintiff, a non-profit organization whose mission was to find affordable housing for its 
members, also filed suit against the Town of Penfield.   
The U.S. Supreme Court in Warth v. Seldin (1975) rendered a 5-4 decision along 
ideological lines with the conservatives of the Court holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. 
The Court held that the low income plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to demonstrate 
that they suffered an injury from being excluded from affordable housing, and not just a 
generalized injury to all similarly situated low-income persons. Rochester taxpayers also lacked 
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prudential standing because Congress had not specifically conferred to those plaintiffs a private 
right of action pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, and because the relief they sought was not 
within the “zone of interest” of protection Congress intended pursuant to the Act. The Court also 
held that the non-profit organization lacked prudential standing because they failed to allege that 
Congress conferred to similarly situated organizations a private right of action to contest 
discrimination regarding this claim. In dicta, the Court further stated that even if there were such 
a statute conferring a private right of action, the non-profit organization would not satisfy 
standing requirements because only a small minority of its membership comprised of low-
income individuals seeking residence in Penfield.  
In dissent, the liberals of the Court argued poignantly that the majority used standing to 
determine which litigants could gain access to the courts. Justice Douglas writes: 
“Standing has become a barrier to access to the federal courts, just as ‘the 
political question’ was in earlier decades. The mounting caseload of federal courts 
is well known. But cases such as this one reflect festering sores in our society, and 
the American dream teaches that, if one reaches high enough and persists, there is 
a forum where justice is dispensed. I would lower the technical barriers and let the 
courts serve that ancient need. They can, in time, be curbed by legislative or 
constitutional restraints if an emergency arises.  
We are today far from facing an emergency. For, in all frankness, no 
Justice of this Court need work more than four days a week to carry his burden” 
(422 U.S. at 518). 
 
Justice Brennan further argues that the majority’s decision premised on standing is 
pretext for not only avoiding rendering a decision on the merits, but also for obscuring the 
majority’s disdain for the plaintiffs’ claim. He writes:  
“While the Court gives lip service to the principle, oft repeated in recent 
years, that ‘standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention 
that particular conduct is illegal,’ … in fact, the opinion, which tosses out of court 
almost every conceivable kind of plaintiff who could be injured by the activity 
claimed to be unconstitutional, can be explained only by an indefensible hostility 
to the claim on the merits. 
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In effect, the Court tells the … plaintiffs they will not be permitted to 
prove what they have alleged … because they have not succeeded in breaching, 
before the suit was filed, the very barriers which are the subject of the suit” (422 
U.S. at 520). 
 
The dissents of Justices Douglas and Brennan illustrate that the liberals of the Court 
believed that the conservative majority used the threshold issue of prudential standing to bar 
litigants from asserting their claims because they disparaged low-income and minority plaintiffs 
seeking residence in a suburb. This case provides anecdotal evidence that the Supreme Court 
used standing to control access by dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims on the grounds of prudential 
standing. This case leads to my final research question: Do courts use the doctrine of prudential 
standing to control access?  As the Supreme Court controls its judicial agenda by certiorari 
review (see Epstein, Segal and Victor 2002), I argue that federal circuit courts transform their 
appellate jurisdiction by deciding cases on the threshold ground of prudential standing in order to 
set their judicial agendas. 
Previous chapters of this dissertation examine how courts control access by rendering 
decisions on jurisdictional and procedural threshold issues. Chapters two and three examined 
how federal circuit courts decide procedural rules and jurisdictional certification issues to control 
which type of litigants gain access to their courts. This chapter focuses on how federal circuit 
courts use the threshold issue of prudential standing to control access to the courts. Prudential 
standing is defined as the federal courts’ ability to deny standing to a litigant to sue pursuant to a 
Congressional statute. While federal courts use of standing is traditionally seen as unfettered 
power because justiciable issues are conferred pursuant to Article III of the U.S. Constitution, 
federal courts are constrained when they employ the doctrine of prudential standing because 
Congress can confer standing by statute. Through the common-law doctrine of prudential 
standing, courts can deny standing to litigants; however, Congress can confer standing to a class 
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of litigants when the court denies standing to such litigants. Pursuant to the doctrine of prudential 
standing, federal courts’ discretion is curbed if Congress decides to confer standing to a class of 
plaintiffs. If Congress is silent, courts can decide whether to confer standing to a class of 
litigants. This principle is illustrated in Warth v. Seldin, where the conservatives of the court 
availed themselves of the opportunity to bar access to the courts to low-income and racial 
minorities in the absence of an expressed Congressional intent. Although this principle is 
illustrated in a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, federal circuit courts also decide issues 
pertaining to prudential standing.  
In this chapter, I theorize that federal circuit courts decide issues of prudential standing 
according to their policy preferences to control litigants’ access to the courts. I argue that federal 
courts are also aware, however, of potential Congressional retaliation and federal circuit court 
panels are constrained based on changes in the ideology of Congress. If courts stray too far from 
the preferences of Congress, courts invite retaliation which could curb their discretion in terms of 
conferring prudential standing. Thus, while circuit court judges seek to have their policy 
preferences enacted into law, they are also constrained by the preferences of Congress. In this 
chapter, I first discuss justiciability and its subset of Article III standing and prudential standing. 
Next, I provide a review of empirical scholarship examining justiciability and, in particular, 
standing. I then discuss my theory and hypotheses. Finally, I test my theory by examining the 
Fair Housing Act of 1968, which was enacted to provide a private right of action to victims of 
discrimination in the housing market and discuss the implications of my results.   
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4.2    Federal Courts and the Doctrine of Justiciability 
Article III provides little guidance in the nature, power and role of the federal judiciary. 
Clause 1 of Section 2 of Article III provides:  
“The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, … -- to controversies to 
which the United States shall be a party; -- to controversies between two or more 
states; -- between a state and citizens of another state; [and] --between citizens of 
different states....” 
 
Note that Article III states that federal courts have the power to adjudicate all “cases” and 
“controversies.” However, the Constitution does not define “cases” or “controversies.” Ironically 
a clause limiting the power of federal courts leaves it to these same courts to interpret those 
provisions granting them this power of adjudication.  
Courts have interpreted the power to adjudicate “cases” and “controversies” as the court’s 
ability to provide relief to a plaintiff seeking redress from an injury (Gottlieb 1994). Federal 
courts have limited their power by devising a number of mechanisms defining which causes of 
action are justiciable (Pushaw 2003). Paramount is the court’s inability to adjudicate a claim if 
the litigant cannot demonstrate that they have a live case. From this doctrine, courts decline 
jurisdiction over issuing advisory opinions, where a coordinate branch seeks a court’s opinion on 
the constitutionality of an act. Furthermore, courts have developed the doctrine of ripeness, 
denying jurisdiction when a litigant fails to assert an actual “controversy” when the litigant has 
not yet suffered an injury or sues in anticipation of an injury that has not yet occurred or 
matured. Courts will similarly decline to adjudicate a claim under the doctrine of mootness if the 
relief the litigant seeks has already been obtained. Another issue that courts have rendered 
nonjusticiable is a political question. Pursuant to this doctrine, a court will decline to adjudicate a 
claim if the political branches of government are better suited to resolve the dispute.  
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4.3    Legal Analysis Examining Article III Standing and Prudential Standing 
 Standing is one of the most commonly adjudicated doctrines of justiciability. Justice 
O’Connor, in Allen v. Wright (1984), defines standing as follows: 
“In essence, the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to 
have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues. Standing 
doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s 
legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more 
appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a 
plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked. 
The requirement of standing, however, has a core component derived directly 
from the Constitution. A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to 
the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the 
requested relief” (468 U.S. 737, 750-51) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted).  
 
Beyond Article III standing, Congress has specified that certain litigants have standing to sue 
pursuant to an expressed grant conferred by statute, i.e., statutory standing. However, there is a 
class of cases where Congress fails to specify whether litigants have standing to sue to enforce a 
statutory provision, what is termed prudential standing. With prudential standing, courts must 
determine Congress’s intent when a statute does not state whether a private right of action exists 
to enforce the statute.
6
   
Under prudential standing, courts apply a “zone of interest test” to determine whether 
Congress intended to confer a private right of action to bring a lawsuit (see Hazardous Waste 
Treatment v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 
(1975)). Courts make a determination of whether the statute created an injury within the 
plaintiff’s “zone of interest” that Congress sought to protect. When a court denies a litigant 
                                                 
6
 Courts have also applied the doctrine of prudential standing to common-law cases. However, this chapter focuses 
on the statutory component to prudential standing.  
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standing based on prudential considerations, Congress can subsequently override the decision of 
the court and confer standing to the class of litigants (Fletcher 1988).  
Prudential standing is best illustrated under the provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).
7
  Under Section 5 of the APA, Congress can confer standing to citizens to 
enforce administrative agencies to carry forth Congressional intent, such as the Clean Water Act 
(Fletcher 1988). Absent Congressional expressed intent, courts must determine whether a private 
right of action exists to enforce a statute.  
Section 5 U.S.C. 702 of the APA provides, in pertinent part:  
“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected 
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to 
judicial review thereof. … Nothing herein 
 
(1) affects other limitations on judicial review or the power or duty of the court to 
dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground; or 
 
(2) confers authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit 
expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.” 
 
Practically, Congress has given federal courts power to interpret statutes to determine if a 
private right of action exists for enforcing provisions to further Congressional intent regarding 
regulations governing the actions of administrative agencies.  
There is a difference between constitutional standing from prudential standing on the 
grounds that constitutional standing is conferred pursuant to Article III affording courts with 
wide discretion in determining standing. As scholars note (Gottlieb 1994; Ho and Ross 2010) 
Article III standing cannot be modified by the courts or Congress. However, prudential standing 
is a creation of the courts where judges have discretion to grant or deny standing to litigants. 
Congress can then confer standing when courts have denied standing to such litigants (Gottlieb 
                                                 
7
 For a brief discussion of the APA, see Chapter 2.  
72 
1994). If a court finds that a plaintiff has prudential standing, the plaintiff must satisfy the 
requirements of Article III standing (Fletcher 1988).  
4.4     The Fair Housing Act 
Congress passed the Fair Housing Act of 1968 to prevent discrimination against 
minorities in the residential housing market (Kushner 1991). The Act conferred a private right of 
action to sue for discrimination on the basis of race, color and national origin in leasing and 
purchasing of residences (Armstrong 1991). The Act now covers discrimination on the basis of 
other protected classes, such as gender and disability. The purpose of the Act is to curb 
discriminatory practices that perpetuated de facto segregation by prohibiting various 
discriminatory practices such as redlining, where financial institutions offer higher interest rates 
to buyers seeking to purchase in minority neighborhoods; discriminatory appraisals, where a 
prospective homeowner is discriminated against on the basis of their race or on the basis of the 
racial composition of a neighborhood which they are seeking to purchase a home; racial steering, 
where realtors “steer” prospective minority buyers to neighborhoods of similar racial 
composition; and exclusionary zoning, where municipalities deny zoning to contractors seeking 
to build multifamily dwellings (Prakash 2013, 1459). The Act also prohibits discrimination in 
transactions associated with the purchasing or leasing of a residence, which ranges from lending, 
insuring, and advertising. There are three methods of enforcing the Fair Housing Act. The 
Attorney General has authority to enforce the Act and file suit against violators. However, the 
primary means of enforcement are lawsuits by persons who allege some violation committed 
against them under the Act (Schwemm 1988). In 1988, Congress amended the Fair Housing Act 
to provide private litigants with a greater incentive to file suit. The amended Act removed a 
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$1,000 cap on punitive damages and removed the requirement of a plaintiff being financially 
indigent in order to win an award of an attorney’s fee (Kushner 1989).  
4.5     Courts and the Ideological Application of the Doctrine of Standing 
Legal scholars have long argued that courts have used the doctrine of standing to control 
litigant access to the courts. These scholars, using primarily qualitative and anecdotal accounts, 
argue that Justices Frankfurter and Brandeis created the doctrine of standing to avoid judicial 
determination on New Deal legislation (Winter 1988; Sunstein 1988; Ho and Ross 2009). These 
justices, fearful of a conservative majority devised standing to allow states to experiment with 
liberal legislation (Winter 1988, 1456). Stearns (1995) argues that the Supreme Court used 
standing as a mechanism to control lower federal courts’ ability to render decisions on the merits 
that invalidated New Deal legislation. Regulations promulgated pursuant to the APA conferred 
standing to various agencies and the government, but did not confer such standing to the 
beneficiaries of agency action (Sunstein 1988). This jurisprudence provided that plaintiffs had 
standing to sue if an agency breached a duty owed directly to the plaintiff. Courts’ application of 
this doctrine limited lawsuits challenging various laws, which protected many New Deal 
regulations. Accordingly, progressive courts limited standing to shield administrative agencies 
from potential lawsuits challenging New Deal regulations. Courts granted standing after 
Congress began to confer standing by statute, indicating an expressed Congressional intent to 
monitor agency action. Liberal courts then recognized that Congressional intent was carried 
forward when litigants had the ability to sue when agencies failed to carry forward their 
Congressional mandate. Liberal courts reasoned that Congress desired to protect the interests of 
those whom the statute sought to protect (Ho and Ross 2010). Even though Congress amended 
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the APA in 1946 to confer standing to litigants who suffered an injury, the general provision left 
room for judicial discretion and ideological interpretation (Sunstein 1988).  
Although there is a rich legal literature examining qualitatively judges’ use of their 
ideology in issues addressing questions of standing, few empirical analyses exist. Among those 
is Segal and Spaeth (1993; 2002), who provide summary statistics regarding standing decisions 
of the Supreme Court. They characterize standing decisions in terms of the Court granting access 
to its doors. Particularly, they surveyed cases from 1953 to 2000 in which the Supreme Court 
questioned a litigant’s standing to sue. They find that the Warren Court conferred standing in 
68.9 percent of its cases, while the Burger and Rehnquist Courts held that plaintiffs had standing 
in 42.7 and 38.6, respectively (2002, 233). However, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
standing in only a small number of cases. Within the terms they examined, only 174 cases within 
that period addressed standing. Of those 174, the Court held that the litigant lacked standing in 
90 cases. Only limited conclusions can be drawn from these preliminary statistics. Using a 
multivariate regression, Ho and Ross (2010) find evidence that as the ideological composition of 
the Supreme Court changes, the majority granted or denied standing to litigants who shared their 
ideological preferences.  
Other scholars have conducted empirical work regarding standing decisions in lower 
federal courts. Staudt (2004) finds that policy preferences impact standing decisions in 
examining cases involving taxpayer standing to challenge governmental expenditures in federal 
courts at all levels of the judicial hierarchy. Regarding circuit courts, she finds that only the party 
of the president of circuit court judges is statistically significant in decisions to confer standing to 
taxpayers seeking to challenge a state law. Pierce (1999) finds that Republican judges are more 
likely than Democratic judges to deny standing to plaintiffs asserting environmental claims. 
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However, Pierce primarily employs a legal analysis and empirically does not control for 
independent variables. Fleisher (2007) used empirics to examine standing decisions for the D.C. 
Circuit Court panels finding no statistically significant difference in the likelihood of 
conservative and liberal panels dismissing a case on standing grounds. Rowland and Todd (1991) 
study the influence of ideology on standing decisions of federal district court judges. They find 
that the ideology of the judge impacts standing decisions. Judges who were appointed by 
President Reagan were slightly less likely to confer standing to litigants classified as 
“underdogs” than Carter-appointed judges. Moreover, Braman (2006) finds experimental 
evidence that legally-trained participants acting as federal district court judges considered the 
merits of a case when rendering a decision to confer standing to conform to their own ideological 
preferences. Rendering a judgment on a threshold issue as opposed to the merits of a case thus 
provides an opportunity to effect the outcome without reaching the merits. Scholars have studies 
Article III standing, but the scholarship examining prudential standing is quite sparse. Warshaw 
and Wannier (2011) find evidence that circuit courts are more likely to confer standing to the 
beneficiaries of the environmental regulation than the industries who are regulated. They find 
that Democratic-appointed circuit panels were more likely deny standing to businesses seeking 
standing in cases involving environmental regulation after the Supreme Court’s decision in Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992). However, public law scholars have yet to provide substantial 
empirical analyses regarding federal courts’ use of standing decisions and access control. As my 
contribution, I offer a theory and testable hypotheses to address this gap in the literature. 
4.6     Theory and Hypotheses 
In previous chapters, I argue federal circuit courts use threshold issues to grant or deny 
access to the courts for certain plaintiffs to control their judicial agendas. Just as circuit court 
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panels use procedural and jurisdictional rules to control access to the courts, I argue that circuit 
court panels use prudential standing to control who can gain access. Specifically, I theorize that 
their decisions reflect their ideological predispositions, and prudential standing provides a 
mechanism for judges to allow their favored litigants access to the courts while denying it to 
those they disfavor. I test this theory in the context of the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Prakash 
(2013) argues that the conservative courts use the threshold issue of prudential standing to bar 
minority plaintiffs seeking relief from discrimination pursuant to the Act. However, she does not 
empirically test this claim. I test whether circuit courts use prudential standing requirements to 
control which parties can gain access to the courts to bring a private right of action pursuant to 
the Fair Housing Act. As explicated in previous chapters, I expect that federal circuit courts are 
responsive to Congressional preferences. Congress can pass legislation conferring standing to 
litigants when federal courts deny them prudential standing. I therefore argue that circuit courts 
are constrained by Congressional ideology because those courts do not desire to render decisions 
outside of Congressional preferences. They are fearful of such retaliation because it limits federal 
circuit courts’ ability to set their own judicial agendas.  
Scholars have concluded that conservatives are more likely to deny access to plaintiffs 
who are either minorities or asserting rights on the behalf of minorities (Prakash 2013; Segal and 
Spaeth 2002; Epstein and Knight 1997). The dissenters in Warth argued that the conservative 
majority use the threshold issue of prudential standing as a pretext for denying litigants access to 
the courts to litigate their claim on the merits. However, the majority’s position and the 
dissenters provide only anecdotal evidence of the majority’s motive. Although the hypothesis I 
test does not seek to ascertain the motive of the justices, I seek to explain the outcome of their 
behavior. Therefore, my second hypothesis is as follows:  
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H1: Conservative panels are more likely than liberal panels to deny plaintiffs prudential 
standing when seeking to enforce the Fair Housing Act.  
As hypothesized in previous chapters, federal courts may use threshold issues as a 
mechanism to control their caseloads (Willging et al. 1996). Also, scholars have argued that 
federal courts develop and increasingly use the doctrine of standing to control the caseload of 
federal courts. As the APA created new potential causes of action, federal courts attempt to 
control access to manage the increase in caseload (Fletcher 1988). Federal courts may be more 
likely to dispose of cases based on a threshold issue in order to reduce their caseload. Therefore, 
my second hypothesis is as follows:  
H2: As the caseload of the circuit increases, the panel is more likely to deny prudential 
standing.  
Also, because Congress confers to groups of people prudential standing, I expect that 
circuit court panels will respond to changes in Congressional ideology. However, any legislation 
that seeks to change the standing status of litigants will be assigned to the House and Senate 
Judiciary Committees. Because the majority party sitting on those committees controls whether 
legislation is voted out of committee, I measure the ideology of the majority party sitting on the 
committee. Therefore, I expect that circuit panels are responsive to changes in these respective 
committees.  
H3: As the ideology of the majority party of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees 
become more conservative, the litigant seeking to enforce the Fair Housing Act is less likely to 
win. 
Furthermore, as the chairs of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees act as 
gatekeepers to any legislation assigned to the committee, the chair has the power to prevent 
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legislation from reaching the chamber floor. Accordingly, I expect that circuit panels are 
responsive to changes in the ideology of the chairs of these respective committees.  
H4: As the ideology of the Chair of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees become 
more conservative, the litigant seeking to enforce the Fair Housing Act is less likely to win. 
4.7      Data and Methods 
Data for this project was collected by reviewing cases published in Lexis/Nexis 
Academic. Because the Fair Housing Act was passed in 1968, I coded cases from 1970 until 
2000. I coded cases decided by panels sitting on the First through Eleventh Federal Courts of 
Appeals and the D.C. Court of Appeals. I searched for all cases that included the terms 
“standing” and “Fair Housing Act.” I coded a total of 96 cases. The dataset includes all published 
and unpublished cases. I coded all cases where a party appealed the decision of the federal 
district court that granted or denied the litigant prudential standing pursuant to the Fair Housing 
Act.  
My dependent variable is whether the litigant seeking standing to enforce the Fair 
Housing Act won the appeal. I coded “1” if the pro-Fair Housing Act litigant won and “0” if that 
litigant lost. My independent variables include the caseload of the federal courts. I measure 
caseloads by the number of cases that were terminated per year by panel for each circuit. My 
independent variables also include the median ideology of the circuit court panel. As in previous 
chapters, I used the Giles, Hettinger, and Pepper nominate scores (Giles et al. 2001) to measure 
the ideology of circuit court judges and the scores developed by Christina Boyd to measure 
district court judges for those who sat on circuit court panels by designation (Boyd 2010).   I 
controlled for the Supreme Court by using the median judicial common space score for the 
Court.  
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I also controlled for the influence of Congress and the President by using the median 
Poole and Rosenthal Common Space scores for the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, 
their Chairs, and the President. For all of these independent variables, I measured the ideological 
distance of the panel from the median ideology of the circuit, the Supreme Court, the 
Congressional variables, and the President. I use a probit analysis as the dependent variable is 
dichotomous. Also, I use robust standard errors clustered on circuit to account for the possibility 
that residuals may not be independent within each circuit. Thus, my model is as follows: 
Standing = β0 + β1 Panel Ideology + β2 Circuit Median + β3 Supreme Court  
+ β4 House Judiciary Committee + β5 Senate Judiciary Committee + β6 House  
Chair + β7 Senate Chair + β8 President + β9 Caseload + ε  
4.8      Results and Discussion 
The summary statistics are presented in Table 4.1 below. 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics 
 
Table 8: Summary Statistics 
Variable       Mean    Standard Dev.       Minimum      Maximum 
Pro-FHA Party .56 .50 0 1 
Panel Ideology -.013 .296 -.543 .581 
Circuit Median .061 .253 -.377 .581 
Supreme Court .088 .073 -.106 .210 
House Party Cmt -.150 .348 -.505 .313 
Senate Party Cmt -.029 .370 -.439 .431 
House Cmt Chair -.224 .348 -.505 .313 
Senate Cmt Chair .083 .345 -.47 .407 
President .182 .544 -.532 .693 
Caseload 745 272 234 2101 
     
 
The summary statistics show that the pro-Fair Housing Act litigant wins at a relatively 
high rate for an appeal; the pro-Fair Housing Act won the appeal at a rate of 56 percent. The 
summary statistics provide some evidence that pro-Fair Housing Act litigants are not at a 
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disadvantage when seeking standing to enforce the provisions of the Act. The summary statistics 
also show that the median ideology of circuit court panels is slightly negative, with the median 
ideologies of the circuit courts and the Supreme Court being slightly positive. Additionally, the 
median ideologies of the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee and the majority party of the 
House and Senate Judiciary Committees are slightly negative, indicating that conservatives 
controlled these committees. The results of the model are presented in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2: Probit Model of the Pro-FHA Litigant Winning 
 
 
Table 9: Probit Model of the Pro-FHA Litigant Winning 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Panel Ideology     -.704 (.535)   
Circuit Median      .750 (1.089)    
Supreme Court   -2.027 (3.815) 
House Judiciary Cmt  19.979* (8.904)      
Senate Judiciary Cmt -11.285* (5.082)     
House Chair -15.717* (5.689)     
Senate Chair   -2.326 (2.778)     
President  10.531* (3.625)   
Caseload      .001 (.001) 
Constant    2.472 (1.645)   
N=94 χ 2 = 34.07 * = p > .05 
 
I find support for the hypothesis regarding the ideology of the Chair of the House 
Judiciary Committee. As the ideological distance of the Chair becomes more conservative in 
relation to the circuit court panel, the pro-Fair Housing Act litigant is less likely to win. I also 
find support for the hypothesis regarding the ideological effects of the majority party of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee. It seems that panels heed to changes in the ideology of the majority 
party of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Panels may be particularly responsive to changes in the 
Senate Judiciary Committee since they hold confirmation hearings for presidential nominees to 
the Supreme Court. However, the coefficient for the majority party of the House Judiciary 
Committee is significant, but positively signed. This indicates that as the majority party of the 
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House Judiciary Committee becomes more liberal, the panel is less likely to confer standing to 
the pro-FHA litigant. This finding is the opposite of my expectations as I expect that panels 
would be more not less likely to confer standing as it became more liberal. Panels could not be 
concerned with changes within that Committee’s ideology. Alternatively, these results must be 
taken with precaution as these variables are highly collinear. The presence of multicollinearity 
can lead to a Type II error, which introduces the possibility of accepting a hypothesis that is false 
(Gujaradi and Porter 2009).  
Furthermore, the results indicate that I cannot reject the null hypotheses for Hypotheses 1 
and 2. Although I do not find support for the hypothesis of the effects of the panel’s ideology, the 
coefficient for this hypothesis is signed in the expected direction. Although signed in the 
expected direction, it appears that the ideology of the circuit panel has no effect on the decision 
to deny or grant prudential standing.  
4.9      Conclusion 
I find little support for my theory that federal circuit courts use the threshold issue of 
prudential standing to control their appellate jurisdiction to set their judicial agendas. However, I 
find support that panels are responsive to Congressional preferences. Circuit panels may not use 
prudential standing to set its judicial agenda because prudential standing may sufficiently 
constrain panels’ preferences. The threat of Congress conferring standing to a group of litigants 
may cause panel to refrain from deciding cases in accordance with their ideological preferences. 
This may lend support for Fix and Randazzo’s (2010) theory that courts render decisions on 
threshold issues to avoid reaching the merits of a case because they desire to defer to the political 
branches of government. Future research should explore why federal circuit courts do not use 
prudential standing in this regard. Also, future research should also explore the circumstances 
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that Congress will enact a statute conferring prudential standing when federal circuit courts have 
previously denied such standing. 
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 5 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I explicate a theory arguing that federal circuit courts transform their 
discretionary appellate jurisdiction into one that is mandatory to set their judicial agendas. 
Particularly, I argue that federal circuit courts achieve this goal by deciding cases on threshold 
grounds to control which litigants gain access to the courts. Circuit courts control access by 
avoiding the merits of a case when they render decisions on threshold grounds. When a court 
decides a case on threshold grounds, the court never adjudicates the merits of a litigant’s claim. 
Consequently, the litigant will never obtain redress from the alleged grievance. Furthermore, a 
higher court will never review the merits of the claim because the circuit court never renders a 
decision on its merits.  
Circuit courts can set their agendas by systematically dismissing cases that are 
incongruent with their policy preferences. That is, courts use the status of the party as a heuristic 
to determine whether their preferences are aligned with the appellant’s position. My findings 
tend to show that conservative circuit courts are more likely than liberal circuits to dismiss a case 
on threshold grounds when the litigant is an individual or plaintiffs seeking certification of a 
class. If the ideology of the court were not a factor, conservative courts would be just as likely as 
liberal courts to dismiss their cases on threshold grounds. However, my findings support the 
former notion. Because my findings show that conservative circuit courts tend to punish 
individual litigants, this has the effect of barring similarly situated litigants from “having their 
day in court.”  Consequently, all litigants do not have equal access to the courts.  
I also set forth a theory arguing that federal circuit courts act strategically when deciding 
threshold issues. As Epstein, Segal and Victor (2002) argue that justices of the Supreme Court 
seek to invite less scrutiny by acting strategically at the agenda-setting stage than the merits 
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stage, I likewise argue that federal circuit courts seek to invite less scrutiny at their agenda-
setting stage than at the merits stage. Because of this, I argue that federal circuit courts are 
keenly aware of Congressional preferences and seek to decide cases within the confines of those 
preferences.  
I examine three types of threshold issues for this dissertation: procedural, jurisdictional, 
and justiciable. In Chapter 2, I discuss how federal circuit courts control access by deciding cases 
involving procedural rules. Federal courts have this power because they not only create the 
Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure, but also interpret those Rules in conformance with their 
ideological preferences. I explicate my theory by examining Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which provides grounds for sanctioning parties and attorneys for filing frivolous 
lawsuits. I find that conservative panels are more likely than liberal panels to rule against 
individual litigants appealing the grant or denial of a Rule 11 sanction. The implications of this 
finding are important because adverse decisions against individual litigants can have a 
substantially chilling effect on their decision to file lawsuits in conservative circuits. I also find 
support that circuit panels are responsive to Congressional preferences, particularly the 
preferences of the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee. Evidence finding that circuit panels 
are responsive to Congressional preferences lends support to my theory that the open rulemaking 
process of the Rules Enabling Act is a sufficient mechanism to constrain the preferences of 
circuit court panels. Because interest groups can “sound the alarm” when circuit panels stray too 
far from Congressional preferences, circuit panels decide cases within the preferences of the 
Chair of the House Judiciary Committee in order to avoid retaliation from Congress.   
In Chapter 3, I discuss how federal circuit courts use jurisdictional issues to set their 
judicial agendas by controlling access to the courts. A federal court must have jurisdiction over a 
85 
party to adjudicate their claim. I test my theory by examining decisions on motions seeking class 
certification in class action litigation. Unlike my finding regarding procedural rules, I find that 
the ideology of the panel does not affect the likelihood that a panel will grant a motion seeking 
class certification. However, I do find that the ideology of the circuit has a significant effect on 
certification decisions. This may be a result of more stringent standard of review governing 
certifications in conservative circuits. That is, conservative circuits have set forth a standard of 
review for class certification to render it more difficult for panels to decide certification decisions 
in conformance with their ideology. Also, this finding provides support that conservative circuit 
courts seek to discourage class action lawsuits, as the evidence from Coffee and Paulovic (2007) 
suggests. However, Congress controls the jurisdiction of the federal courts and, therefore, 
controls which litigants can bring lawsuits in federal court. This includes decisions governing 
certification of class action lawsuits. However, my findings do not support the theory that circuit 
panels are constrained by Congressional preferences. The lack of an open process like the Rules 
Enabling Act may explain why circuit courts are not responsive to Congressional preferences. 
In Chapter 4, I examine whether circuit courts control their agendas by determining that 
litigants lack prudential standing to bring their claims into court. Federal courts have power to 
deny prudential standing when Congress is silent regarding whether litigants have a private right 
of action to enforce a provision of a Congressional statute. I argue that federal courts use this 
power to control which litigants gain access to the courts. I test my theory by examining 
decisions to grant or deny prudential standing to litigants seeking enforcement of the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968. However, my findings do not support the notion that federal circuit courts 
use the doctrine of prudential standing to control which litigants gain access to the courts. I also 
expect that Congressional preferences influence circuit court decisions because Congress has the 
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power to confer standing when a federal court denies prudential standing to a class of litigants. 
My findings provide some support for this expectation. I find that circuit panels are more likely 
to deny prudential standing as the majority party of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the 
Chair of the House Judiciary Committee become more conservative. However, my findings 
regarding the majority party of the House Judiciary Committee do not conform to my 
expectations. These findings may show that the ideology of circuit panels is constrained by 
Congressional preferences. However, these results must be taken with precaution as the 
Congressional variables are highly collinear.  
In conclusion, I argue that federal circuit courts transform their mandatory appellate 
jurisdiction to one that is discretionary to set their judicial agendas. I find support for my theory 
that federal circuit courts seek to set their agendas by controlling which litigants gain access to 
the courts. I find evidence that federal circuit courts use jurisdictional issues to control access in 
decisions to certify a class. The strongest support for this notion is discussed in my chapter 
examining procedural rules. Unlike jurisdictional and justiciable issues, federal circuit courts 
have power to promulgate procedural rules and render decisions interpreting those rules 
according to their policy preferences. Congress has structured this rulemaking process to allow 
ideologically aligned interest groups to “sound the alarm” when federal court preferences stray 
too far from Congressional preferences. Similar effects are not evident the chapter examining 
jurisdiction and those effects are questionable in the chapter examining justiciability. This may 
lend evidence that an open process is a necessary to constrain the ideological preferences of the 
federal circuit panels.  
The implications of these findings are important. Because circuit courts practically serve 
as the court of last resort for the vast majority of appellants, they have little recourse when a 
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circuit court denies them access. Particularly, if conservative panels are more likely to rule 
against individuals, then individuals could be deterred from filing lawsuits. Moreover, this 
provides circuit panels with great power to control their judicial agendas. If circuit courts are 
successful in using threshold issues to control which cases it chooses to hear, it can 
systematically choose to hear cases at the merits stage and render decisions that maximize their 
policy goals. If circuit courts can achieve this goal, they are able to set their judicial agendas in a 
similar manner as the U.S. Supreme Court set its agenda by certiorari review.  
I plan to continue my research examining how federal circuit courts set their agendas in 
this regard. In my dissertation, I study how circuit courts decide cases involving procedural rules 
according to their policy preferences. In future work, I will examine how federal courts create 
procedural rules according to their preferences and how these rules affect litigant access. Also, I 
will explore the role of interest groups in the rulemaking process. As Scherer et al. (2008) find 
that interest groups play an important role in the confirmation process of federal judges, I seek to 
further understand the influence of interest groups in procedural rulemaking. Additionally, I will 
further study the role legal doctrine has in constraining jurisdictional issues. As my findings 
show that conservative circuit courts use jurisdictional issues of decisions to certify a class, I will 
explore how circuit courts create legal doctrine to constrain panels’ decisions in class 
certifications. Regarding prudential standing, I will investigate the conditions Congress retaliates 
and confers standing when a federal court denies prudential standing to certain litigants.  
My long-term research agenda expands beyond the study of federal circuit courts. As I 
argue that federal circuit courts set their agendas by using threshold issue to control their 
appellate jurisdiction, I will explore whether this phenomenon occurs within federal district 
courts. If this occurs within federal district courts, litigants are totally barred from obtaining 
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redress from any federal court. Also, I seek to explore state courts’ ability to set their agendas by 
deciding cases on threshold grounds. As research has shown that state court selection systems 
vary judicial outcomes (see Huber and Gordon 2004; Brace and Boyea 2008), I will explore 
whether selection systems affect state courts’ ability to control their judicial agendas. In 
conclusion, public law scholars can better understand the power of the courts to set their judicial 
agendas by controlling access when rendering decisions on threshold grounds.  
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